kernel: processes have an environment now, and zsh is the shell

Porting zsh found four defects in the kernel and one in the filesystem. None
of them were about zsh; all of them had been there the whole time.

**exec threw the environment away.** kernel/fs/exec.c wrote a single zero for
envp with the comment "(no environment)" -- not yet, but ever, for every
process. musl has been passing a perfectly good envp to execve (Linux 59, which
SchOS answers) and it was never read. So $TERM was unset, $PATH was whatever
each program invented, and a variable exported in a shell did not survive the
exec meant to carry it. exec() takes an envp, sys_exec reads argument three,
and schinit manifests grew an Environment key. The userland two-argument
exec(path, argv) stays as a wrapper that passes null explicitly -- the raw stub
is execve now, so a short caller cannot leave %rdx holding a stray pointer.

**Which overflowed the kernel stack.** Three pointer arrays, ~1.8 KB, on a
4096-byte stack, under exec -> loaduvm -> readi -> SchFS -> btree. Pid 1 went
down on the first exec. The canary caught it and named the process, which is
what it is for. They live in one kalloc'd page now.

**waitpid returned a bare -1** for both "no children" and "interrupted". musl
reads [-4095,-1] as -errno, so userspace saw EPERM; zsh printed "wait failed:
operation not permitted" and abandoned the rest of /etc/zsh/zshrc. -ECHILD and
-EINTR now. Third time a bare -1 has cost real time -- on a system with no
permission model, EPERM should be read as "a syscall returned -1".

**NVMA was 64.** musl's allocator takes a mapping per size class and does not
release them eagerly, so compinit ran out of slots and got -1, which is EPERM,
which malloc turns into NULL, which zsh reports as "fatal error: out of memory"
-- on a machine with 1000 MB free. 256 slots, and -ENOMEM.

**And a small write to SchFS costs 58 ms.** 200 writes to one open file take
11.75 s; the same to /dev/null take 0.14 s. That is the design stated at the
top of kmount.c -- one transaction group per operation, and a commit is two
flushes and an uberblock -- not a bug. But compdump writes its digest with
thousands of separate prints, so it takes minutes and looks like a hang.
compinit -D, which skips the dump, finishes in 3.6 s. This one is a decision
rather than a fix, so it is written up and left: /etc/zsh/zshrc keeps compinit
switched off and explains exactly why, with the measurements.

zsh runs as /bin/zsh and is the console shell. ZLE works -- arrow keys recall
history through terminfo, $COLUMNS reads the real 160 because TIOCGWINSZ was
fixed, colour and prompt expansion work, startup is 0.14 s. mksh keeps /bin/sh,
so schinit's no-jobs fallback is a different program from the one that could
have failed.

Also fixed while here: AT_CLKTCK was the literal 100 and is USER_HZ; the
extract rule in four ports could move a source tree inside itself when make
re-ran it, which is how zsh's configure came to write modfile=zsh-5.9/... into
config.modules and fail three steps later.

schfs-check passes. Full writeup in docs/history/kernel.md section 14.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
This commit is contained in:
Nexoniarz 2026-09-12 23:26:50 +02:00
commit 14f0e4d0e2
22 changed files with 684 additions and 24 deletions

View file

@ -18,20 +18,39 @@
extern int linux_syscall_map[];
extern int linux_syscall_map_size;
// envp may be null, which means "no environment" -- the same thing this
// function used to do unconditionally.
int
exec(char *path, char **argv)
exec(char *path, char **argv, char **envp)
{
uint64 _t0 = rdtsc();
fsstat.exec_calls++;
char *s, *last;
int i, off;
uint64 argc, sz, sp, ustack[MAXARG+1];
uint64 argc, envc, sz, sp;
struct elfhdr elf;
struct inode *ip;
struct proghdr ph;
pml4e_t *pgdir, *oldpgdir;
uint64 stack_slots[MAXARG + 32];
int slot;
// The three pointer arrays live on the heap, not on the kernel stack.
//
// Together they are about 1.8 KB, and KSTACKSIZE is 4096 -- with the call
// chain under this function running exec -> loaduvm -> readi -> SchFS ->
// btree, there is not 1.8 KB to spare. Putting them here overflowed the
// stack on the first exec after the environment was added, and the canary
// in param.h caught it on pid 1 before it could corrupt anything.
//
// One page holds all three with room over.
uint64 *scratch = (uint64*)kalloc();
if(!scratch)
return -1;
uint64 *ustack = scratch; /* MAXARG+1 */
uint64 *estack = ustack + MAXARG + 1; /* MAXENV+1 */
uint64 *stack_slots = estack + MAXENV + 1; /* the rest */
_Static_assert((MAXARG + 1 + MAXENV + 1 + MAXARG + MAXENV + 32) * 8 <= 4096,
"exec scratch does not fit in one page");
uint64 max_sz = 0;
uint64 rand_va = 0;
@ -97,6 +116,19 @@ exec(char *path, char **argv)
ustack[argc] = sp;
}
// The environment, copied the same way and for the same reason: these
// strings live in the *old* address space, which is still mapped, and will
// not be once the new pgdir is installed.
for(envc = 0; envp && envp[envc]; envc++) {
if(envc >= MAXENV)
goto bad;
sp -= strlen(envp[envc]) + 1;
sp &= ~7;
if(copyout(pgdir, sp, envp[envc], strlen(envp[envc]) + 1) < 0)
goto bad;
estack[envc] = sp;
}
// Push 16 pseudo-random bytes for AT_RANDOM.
{
uint8 randbuf[16];
@ -117,13 +149,20 @@ exec(char *path, char **argv)
}
stack_slots[slot++] = 0; // end of argv
stack_slots[slot++] = 0; // end of envp (no environment)
// The environment used to be a single zero here, with the comment "(no
// environment)". Nothing on SchOS had one: not a shell, not a musl program
// that had just called execve with a perfectly good envp, not anything. So
// $TERM was unset, $PATH was whatever each program invented, and a variable
// exported in a shell did not survive the exec that was supposed to carry it.
for(i = 0; i < envc; i++)
stack_slots[slot++] = estack[i];
stack_slots[slot++] = 0; // end of envp
// Auxiliary vector — musl reads these for page size, clock, etc.
stack_slots[slot++] = 6; // AT_PAGESZ
stack_slots[slot++] = 4096;
stack_slots[slot++] = 17; // AT_CLKTCK
stack_slots[slot++] = 100;
stack_slots[slot++] = USER_HZ; // what times() is scaled to, not a literal
stack_slots[slot++] = 23; // AT_SECURE = 0 (not setuid)
stack_slots[slot++] = 0;
stack_slots[slot++] = 11; // AT_UID
@ -232,10 +271,12 @@ exec(char *path, char **argv)
switchuvm(myproc());
freevm(oldpgdir);
kfree((char*)scratch);
fsstat.exec_cycles += rdtsc() - _t0;
return 0;
bad:
kfree((char*)scratch);
if(pgdir)
freevm(pgdir);
if(ip){

View file

@ -383,9 +383,20 @@ waitpid(int pid, int *status, int options)
}
}
if(!havekids || myproc()->killed){
// Two different failures, and they used to share one bare -1.
//
// musl reads a return in [-4095, -1] as -errno, so -1 arrived in
// userspace as EPERM: "operation not permitted". zsh's compinit calls
// wait, got that, printed "wait failed: operation not permitted", and
// abandoned the rest of /etc/zsh/zshrc -- which looked like a broken
// config file rather than a wait() that could not say what went wrong.
if(!havekids){
release(&ptable.lock);
return -1;
return -ECHILD; // nothing to wait for, which is not an error
}
if(myproc()->killed){
release(&ptable.lock);
return -EINTR; // a signal arrived while waiting
}
if (options & 1) { // WNOHANG

View file

@ -726,8 +726,8 @@ bad_unlink: iunlockput(dp); end_op(); return -1;
addr_t sys_exec(void)
{
char *path, *argv[MAXARG];
addr_t uargv, uarg;
char *path, *argv[MAXARG], *envp[MAXENV];
addr_t uargv, uenvp, uarg;
if (argstr(0, &path) < 0 || argaddr(1, &uargv) < 0) return -EFAULT;
memset(argv, 0, sizeof(argv));
for (int i = 0; ; i++) {
@ -736,7 +736,24 @@ addr_t sys_exec(void)
if (!uarg) { argv[i] = 0; break; }
if (fetchstr(uarg, &argv[i]) < 0) return -EFAULT;
}
return exec(path, argv);
// The third argument. This is Linux's execve(2), so musl has been passing
// an environment here all along -- it was simply never read, and every
// program on the system started with an empty one.
//
// A null envp is legal and means exactly that. It is also what the
// first-party exec() wrapper passes, so old callers keep their old
// behaviour without knowing about this.
memset(envp, 0, sizeof(envp));
if (argaddr(2, &uenvp) == 0 && uenvp) {
for (int i = 0; ; i++) {
if (i >= NELEM(envp)) return -E2BIG;
if (fetchaddr(uenvp + sizeof(addr_t) * i, &uarg) < 0) return -EFAULT;
if (!uarg) { envp[i] = 0; break; }
if (fetchstr(uarg, &envp[i]) < 0) return -EFAULT;
}
}
return exec(path, argv, envp);
}
// ftruncate/truncate both grow and shrink. Growing used to be quietly dropped

View file

@ -95,7 +95,11 @@ sys_mmap(void)
for (int i = 0; i < NVMA; i++) {
if (!myproc()->vma[i].used) { v = &myproc()->vma[i]; break; }
}
if (!v) return -1;
// -ENOMEM, not -1. A bare -1 reaches musl as -EPERM, so a process that
// had simply used all NVMA slots was told "operation not permitted" --
// which sends you looking for a permission model this system does not
// have. malloc() turns either into NULL, but only one of them is a clue.
if (!v) return -ENOMEM;
// Ignore non-zero hint addresses (not MAP_FIXED); always pick a fresh VA.
// Bump-allocated: each mapping gets its own disjoint, exactly-length-sized