unix: a bound socket is a file

Gate 1, item 3, and the last of foundations.md.

bind() creates a T_SOCK node at the path; connect() resolves the path and looks
for the socket bound to **that inode**. Matching on the inode rather than on
the path *string* is the part that matters: the name used to live only in the
socket table, so two spellings of one path missed each other, a relative path
never matched an absolute one, and there was nothing to stat() or unlink().
An inode is the thing a path resolves *to*, so connect() can walk the path
however it likes and arrive at the same socket.

    # ls -l /tmp
    srwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 2026-09-22 08:04 socktest

The node is a marker, not the binding. It holds no data and the live
association stays in the socket table, so a socket file left by a crash is
what Linux leaves behind -- a dead file that connect() refuses until something
binds again -- and unlink()ing a live socket's path does not disturb anyone
already connected.

EADDRINUSE comes from the *directory* rather than from a scan of the table,
deliberately: a stale socket file has to refuse a rebind for the same reason a
running server's does, or two servers both believe they own it. The creation
lives in sys_bind() and not in unix.c, because that is the layer with both --
kernel/net/unix.c knows about sockets and has no business calling create().

T_SOCK is a compat addition to SchFS by the rule in schfs.h: a driver that does
not know SCHFS_T_SOCK maps it to a zero-length regular file, so nothing goes
stale and nothing becomes unreadable.

cmd/socktest section 15 asserts the plan's own wording -- bind, stat, see an
`s`, unlink -- plus the two a name table could never fail: a second bind to a
live path is refused, and connecting to a path that is a *regular file* is
refused rather than matched by name.

**And the semantics being real broke socktest on its second run**, correctly:
the socket files persisted and every bind() hit EADDRINUSE. Every real server
unlinks before binding; socktest now does too, which is the change the new
behaviour demands rather than a workaround for it.

Chasing that turned up something worse. `socktest` reported rc=1 with every
check passing, and so did every other first-party program:

  - **lib/start.S called main and threw %eax away.** sys_exit() reads the
    status from %rdi and nothing put it there, so every program exited with
    whatever that register happened to hold. Every test suite ends in
    `return failures ? 1 : 0` and none of it reached the shell.
  - **exit(void) passed no status either**, for the same reason: the
    declaration takes no argument, so %rdi was the caller's litter.

`if socktest; then` works now, and a failing command reports 1 -- checked both
ways, because a fix that makes everything return 0 would look identical from
the success side.

Also factored: unlink_path() out of sys_unlink, so a failed bind can take its
own node back out without going through the syscall entry, and create_sock()
as a named door rather than exporting create() with an arbitrary type.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Nexoniarz 2026-09-22 10:06:10 +02:00
commit 3f13989883
15 changed files with 339 additions and 45 deletions

View file

@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
#include "types.h"
#include "user.h"
#include "socket.h"
#include "stat.h"
#include "fcntl.h"
static int failures;
@ -54,6 +56,12 @@ streq(const char *a, const char *b)
// Fill a sockaddr_un and return the length to pass to bind/connect: the
// family plus the path plus its NUL, which is what musl computes and what the
// kernel side is written to expect.
// Every bind() here is preceded by an unlink(), which is not tidiness: a bound
// socket is a *file* now, and it outlives the process that bound it. Rebinding
// a path that already has a node is EADDRINUSE, exactly as on Linux, so every
// real server removes the stale one first. Before this change the name lived
// only in the kernel's socket table and vanished when the process did, so a
// test could bind the same path on every run and never notice.
static int
mkaddr(struct sockaddr_un *sa, const char *path)
{
@ -72,7 +80,10 @@ static void
test_roundtrip(void)
{
struct sockaddr_un sa;
int len = mkaddr(&sa, "/tmp/socktest");
int len;
unlink("/tmp/socktest"); // a stale node from an earlier run
len = mkaddr(&sa, "/tmp/socktest");
int srv, pid, cli, n;
char buf[64];
@ -140,7 +151,10 @@ static void
test_errors(void)
{
struct sockaddr_un sa;
int len = mkaddr(&sa, "/tmp/nobody-listening");
int len;
unlink("/tmp/nobody-listening"); // a stale node from an earlier run
len = mkaddr(&sa, "/tmp/nobody-listening");
int s;
puts_("error paths:\n");
@ -181,7 +195,10 @@ static void
test_eof(void)
{
struct sockaddr_un sa;
int len = mkaddr(&sa, "/tmp/socktest-eof");
int len;
unlink("/tmp/socktest-eof"); // a stale node from an earlier run
len = mkaddr(&sa, "/tmp/socktest-eof");
int srv, cli, pid, n;
char buf[16];
@ -743,6 +760,76 @@ test_fdpass_nodata(void)
close(p[0]); close(sv[0]); close(sv[1]);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 15. A bound socket is a file.
//
// docs/plan/foundations.md item 3, in its own words: bind() a socket, then
// stat() and `ls -l` the path and see an `s`, then unlink() it.
//
// The reason it matters is not tidiness. A Wayland client finds its compositor
// by bind()ing a real path and libwayland locks the file beside it; a name
// table in the kernel can express neither. These checks are what a name table
// cannot pass -- every one of them asks the *filesystem* about the socket,
// not the socket layer.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void
test_fsnames(void)
{
struct sockaddr_un sa;
struct stat st;
int len, sv, c;
puts_("a bound socket is a file:\n");
unlink("/tmp/socktest-fs"); // from a previous run
sv = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
len = mkaddr(&sa, "/tmp/socktest-fs");
check(sv >= 0, "socket()");
check(bind(sv, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, len) == 0, "bind creates the path");
check(stat("/tmp/socktest-fs", &st) == 0, "and it can be stat()ed");
check(st.type == T_SOCK, "as a socket, not a regular file");
// Binding the same path twice is EADDRINUSE, and it has to come from the
// directory -- a socket file left by a crashed server must refuse a
// rebind for the same reason a running one does.
{
int s2 = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
check(s2 >= 0 && bind(s2, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, len) < 0,
"a second bind to the same path is refused");
if (s2 >= 0) close(s2);
}
// Connecting to a path that is not a socket must be refused rather than
// matched by name. A name table could not tell the difference.
{
struct sockaddr_un sb;
int lb = mkaddr(&sb, "/tmp/socktest-notasock");
int fd = open("/tmp/socktest-notasock", O_CREATE | O_RDWR);
if (fd >= 0) close(fd);
c = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
check(c >= 0 && connect(c, (struct sockaddr *)&sb, lb) < 0,
"connecting to a regular file is refused");
if (c >= 0) close(c);
unlink("/tmp/socktest-notasock");
}
check(unlink("/tmp/socktest-fs") == 0, "unlink removes it");
check(stat("/tmp/socktest-fs", &st) < 0, "and it is gone from the filesystem");
// The path is free again. On Linux the old socket keeps working for
// anyone already connected; it is simply no longer findable by name.
{
int s3 = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
check(s3 >= 0 && bind(s3, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, len) == 0,
"and the path is free to bind again");
if (s3 >= 0) close(s3);
unlink("/tmp/socktest-fs");
}
close(sv);
}
int
main(void)
{
@ -761,6 +848,7 @@ main(void)
test_fdpass_orphaned();
test_fdpass_truncated();
test_fdpass_nodata();
test_fsnames();
if (failures == 0)
puts_("socktest: ALL CHECKS PASSED\n");

View file

@ -170,11 +170,41 @@ two-object locking needs an ordering rule every path obeys or it deadlocks.
Worse, the wakeup races are subtle — a reader testing `peer_closed` under its own
lock while the closer sets it under the peer's has no interlock at all.
**Names live in a table here, not in the filesystem.** Binding creates no
directory entry. The table gives the behaviour that matters — a client finds a
server by a name agreed in advance — and what is lost is `ls -l` showing an `s`,
and `unlink()` of a socket path working. Both want a VFS change rather than a
socket change.
**A bound socket is a file.** `bind()` creates a `T_SOCK` node at the path, and
`connect()` resolves the path and looks for the socket bound to **that inode**.
Matching on the inode rather than on the path *string* is the part that
matters. The name used to live only in this table, so two spellings of one path
missed each other, a relative path never matched an absolute one, and there was
nothing to `stat()` or `unlink()`. An inode is the thing a path resolves *to* —
so `connect()` can walk the path however it likes and still arrive at the same
socket, which is precisely what a string comparison could never do.
```
# ls -l /tmp
srwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 2026-09-22 08:04 socktest
```
The node is a **marker, not the binding**. It holds no data, and the live
association is in this table. So a socket file left behind by a crash is what
Linux leaves behind: a dead file that `connect()` refuses until something binds
to it again. Conversely, `unlink()`ing a live socket's path does not disturb
anyone already connected — the socket simply stops being findable.
`EADDRINUSE` comes from the *directory*, not from a scan of this table, and
that is deliberate: a stale socket file has to refuse a rebind for the same
reason a running server's does, or two servers both believe they own it. The
consequence is the one every real server already handles — `unlink()` before
`bind()`, which `cmd/socktest` now does too.
The creation lives in `sys_bind()` rather than here, because that is the layer
with both: `kernel/net/unix.c` knows about sockets and has no business calling
`create()`.
**`flock()` is still missing.** libwayland locks `wayland-0.lock` beside the
socket so that two compositors cannot claim one display. The lock file can be
created and opened now that paths are real; the advisory lock itself is a
separate mechanism with no other caller yet.
### Descriptor passing

View file

@ -436,7 +436,14 @@ Nothing above needs these; everything below stops without them.
System V key, which is the whole reason it exists on Linux.
`cmd/memfdtest`: seventeen checks, ending with a memfd sent over a
socket to a receiver that closes every inherited copy first.
- [ ] **Item 3 — `AF_UNIX` sockets in the filesystem namespace.**
- [x] ~~**Item 3 — `AF_UNIX` sockets in the filesystem namespace.**~~ `bind()`
creates a `T_SOCK` node; `connect()` resolves the path and matches the
socket bound to *that inode*, not to a string. `ls -l` shows
`srwxr-xr-x`, `stat()` reports `S_IFSOCK`, `unlink()` removes it, and a
second bind to a live path is `EADDRINUSE` *from the directory* — which
is what makes a socket file left by a crashed server refuse a rebind, as
it must. `cmd/socktest` section 15. `flock()` is still missing and is
recorded as such.
### Gate 2 — Init as a role — **done**

View file

@ -97,12 +97,18 @@ carries `shmid` and a `no_free` flag for pages that are not ours to release).
The general answer — a page cache, and writable `MAP_SHARED` of a real file —
stays owed. It is a larger project and nothing on this plan needs it.
### 3. `AF_UNIX` sockets in the filesystem namespace
### 3. `AF_UNIX` sockets in the filesystem namespace — **done**
Clients find a Wayland compositor by `bind()`ing `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/wayland-0` as
a real path, and libwayland `flock()`s the lock file beside it. A name table can
express neither.
`bind()` creates a `T_SOCK` node and `connect()` resolves the path and matches
the socket bound to **that inode** — not to a string, which is what made two
spellings of one path miss each other. `ls -l` shows `srwxr-xr-x`, `stat()`
reports `S_IFSOCK`, and `unlink()` removes it. Asserted by `cmd/socktest`,
section 15. `flock()` is still not implemented; see below.
`kernel/net/unix.c`'s own header comment already predicted this:
> *"What is lost is `ls -l /tmp/schcom` showing an `s`, and `unlink()` of a socket
@ -159,3 +165,7 @@ These belong in `bootcheck` as a new switch, following the `-Sock` model.
- **`SO_*` coverage is the two options named**, not the full set.
- **No credential passing** (`SCM_CREDENTIALS`) — only descriptors. Nothing on
this plan needs it, and a compositor that wants to know who connected will.
- **No `flock()`.** libwayland locks `wayland-0.lock` beside the socket to stop
two compositors claiming one display. The socket itself is now a real path,
so the lock file can be created and opened; what is missing is the advisory
lock, which is a separate mechanism and has no other caller yet.

View file

@ -164,6 +164,10 @@ uint tree_expand(struct inode *ip, uint off);
void tree_search(struct inode* dp, char* name, uint* poff, struct dirent* de,uint add);
void build_dir_tree(struct inode* dp,uint64 pinum);
struct inode* divesymlink(struct inode *);
// A socket node for AF_UNIX bind(2), and unlink by path for the failure that
// follows it. See the notes on each in kernel/sys/sys_fs.c.
struct inode* create_sock(char *path);
int unlink_path(char *path);
void readsb(int dev, struct superblock *sb);
// pci.c -- bus enumeration. Drivers that need to *find* their hardware use
@ -469,10 +473,10 @@ int sockwrite(struct socket*, char*, int);
// The same two, carrying descriptors. See kernel/net/unix.c.
int sockread_fds(struct socket*, char*, int, struct file**, int*);
int sockwrite_fds(struct socket*, char*, int, struct file**, int);
int sockbind(struct socket*, const char *path);
int sockbind(struct socket*, const char *path, uint dev, uint64 ino);
int socklisten(struct socket*, int backlog);
struct socket* sockaccept(struct socket*);
int sockconnect(struct socket*, const char *path);
int sockconnect(struct socket*, uint dev, uint64 ino);
int sockreadable(struct socket*);
int sock_hup(struct socket*);
int sock_shutdown(struct socket*, int how);

View file

@ -293,6 +293,11 @@ _Static_assert(__builtin_offsetof(struct schfs_uberblock, next_objectid) == 72,
#define SCHFS_T_DIR 2
#define SCHFS_T_DEV 3
#define SCHFS_T_SYMLINK 4
// A bound AF_UNIX socket. A *compat* addition by the rule above: a driver that
// does not know this value maps it to SCHFS_T_FILE and sees a zero-length
// regular file, which is harmless -- nothing goes stale and nothing becomes
// unreadable, so it needs no feature flag.
#define SCHFS_T_SOCK 5
struct schfs_inode {
uint64_t size;

View file

@ -309,7 +309,21 @@ struct socket {
// wants a struct socket.
void *inet;
char name[UNIX_PATH_MAX]; // the bound path, for a listener
char name[UNIX_PATH_MAX]; // the bound path, for a listener and getsockname
// The filesystem node bind() created, by identity rather than by name.
//
// Matching on the *path string* was what made these sockets invisible to the
// filesystem: two spellings of one path missed each other, a relative path
// never matched an absolute one, and there was nothing to stat() or
// unlink(). An inode is the thing a path resolves *to*, so connect() can
// walk the path however it likes and still arrive at the same socket.
//
// bind_dev 0 means "no node": a socket bound before this existed, or one
// whose file has been unlinked. The socket stays bound and stays usable by
// anyone already connected; it is simply no longer findable, which is
// exactly what Linux does.
uint bind_dev;
uint64 bind_ino;
// A connected socket's peer. Writing to a socket appends to the *peer's*
// buffer, which is what makes one buffer per socket enough for a

View file

@ -6,6 +6,13 @@
#define T_DEV 3 // Device
#define T_SYMLINK 4 // Divesymlink
#define T_EXTENT 5 // bmap & itrunc
// A bound AF_UNIX socket. The node is a *marker*: it is what makes a socket
// findable by path, stat()able and unlink()able, and it holds no data. The
// live binding lives in kernel/net/unix.c and is matched by (dev, inum), not
// by this node's contents -- so a socket file left behind by a crash is
// exactly what Linux leaves behind, a dead file that connect() refuses until
// something binds to it again.
#define T_SOCK 6
struct stat {
int32 type; // File type (T_DIR, T_FILE, or T_DEV)

View file

@ -1203,6 +1203,7 @@ kp_entry(uint64_t ino, uint16_t type, const char *name, unsigned namelen,
kp_puts(c->buf, c->cap, c->len,
type == SCHFS_T_DIR ? "dir " :
type == SCHFS_T_SYMLINK ? "symlink " :
type == SCHFS_T_SOCK ? "socket " :
type == SCHFS_T_DEV ? "dev " : "file ");
for (unsigned i = 0; i < namelen && *c->len < c->cap - 1; i++)
c->buf[(*c->len)++] = name[i];

View file

@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ type_to_vfs(uint16_t t)
case SCHFS_T_DIR: return T_DIR;
case SCHFS_T_DEV: return T_DEV;
case SCHFS_T_SYMLINK: return T_SYMLINK;
case SCHFS_T_SOCK: return T_SOCK;
default: return T_FILE;
}
}
@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ type_from_vfs(short t)
case T_DIR: return SCHFS_T_DIR;
case T_DEV: return SCHFS_T_DEV;
case T_SYMLINK: return SCHFS_T_SYMLINK;
case T_SOCK: return SCHFS_T_SOCK;
default: return SCHFS_T_FILE;
}
}
@ -434,6 +436,7 @@ gd_emit(struct gd_ctx *g, uint64 ino, unsigned short type,
*(uint8 *)(k + 18) = type == SCHFS_T_DIR ? 4 /* DT_DIR */
: type == SCHFS_T_DEV ? 2 /* DT_CHR */
: type == SCHFS_T_SYMLINK ? 10 /* DT_LNK */
: type == SCHFS_T_SOCK ? 12 /* DT_SOCK */
: 8; /* DT_REG */
memmove(k + 19, name, namelen);
memset(k + 19 + namelen, 0, reclen - 19 - namelen);

View file

@ -133,12 +133,12 @@ alloc_locked(int type)
// Find a socket listening on this name. Caller holds stab.lock.
static struct socket *
find_listener(const char *name)
find_listener_ino(uint dev, uint64 ino)
{
struct socket *s;
for(s = stab.sock; s < stab.sock + NSOCK; s++)
if(s->state == SS_LISTENING && strncmp(s->name, name, UNIX_PATH_MAX) == 0)
if(s->state == SS_LISTENING && s->bind_dev == dev && s->bind_ino == ino)
return s;
return 0;
}
@ -656,11 +656,22 @@ sockpair(struct socket **pa, struct socket **pb)
return 0;
}
// bind(2) for AF_UNIX. The caller has already created the filesystem node and
// hands over its identity; see sys_bind() in kernel/sys/sys_net.c for why the
// creation lives there and not here.
//
// The name used to live only in this table, so `bind()` created nothing --
// there was no file to stat(), no `s` in `ls -l`, and nothing to unlink. A
// Wayland client finds its compositor by bind()ing a real path, and
// libwayland locks the file beside it; a name table can express neither.
//
// **The node is a marker, not the binding.** It holds no data. What makes a
// socket findable is that connect() resolves the path to an inode and looks
// for the socket bound to *that inode*, so any spelling of the path arrives
// at the same place -- which a string comparison could never manage.
int
sockbind(struct socket *s, const char *path)
sockbind(struct socket *s, const char *path, uint dev, uint64 ino)
{
struct socket *other;
if(path[0] == '\0')
return -EINVAL;
@ -669,14 +680,9 @@ sockbind(struct socket *s, const char *path)
release(&stab.lock);
return -EINVAL;
}
for(other = stab.sock; other < stab.sock + NSOCK; other++){
if(other != s && other->state >= SS_BOUND &&
strncmp(other->name, path, UNIX_PATH_MAX) == 0){
release(&stab.lock);
return -EADDRINUSE;
}
}
safestrcpy(s->name, path, UNIX_PATH_MAX);
s->bind_dev = dev;
s->bind_ino = ino;
s->state = SS_BOUND;
release(&stab.lock);
return 0;
@ -753,8 +759,11 @@ sockaccept(struct socket *s)
return c;
}
// connect(2) for AF_UNIX. The listener is the socket bound to the inode the
// path resolved to -- the caller did the resolving, for the same reason
// sockbind() does not create the node.
int
sockconnect(struct socket *s, const char *path)
sockconnect(struct socket *s, uint dev, uint64 ino)
{
struct socket *srv, *peer;
@ -763,7 +772,7 @@ sockconnect(struct socket *s, const char *path)
release(&stab.lock);
return -EINVAL;
}
srv = find_listener(path);
srv = find_listener_ino(dev, ino);
if(srv == 0){
release(&stab.lock);
return -ECONNREFUSED;

View file

@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ struct linux_stat {
#define LINUX_S_IFCHR 0020000
#define LINUX_S_IFREG 0100000
#define LINUX_S_IFLNK 0120000
#define LINUX_S_IFSOCK 0140000
// Linux's dev_t: 12 bits of major and 8 of minor packed into the low 32, with
// the overflow of each above that. Spelled out in full rather than as
@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ stati_linux(struct inode *ip, struct linux_stat *st)
case T_DIR: type_bits = LINUX_S_IFDIR; perm_bits = 0755; break;
case T_DEV: type_bits = LINUX_S_IFCHR; perm_bits = 0666; break;
case T_SYMLINK: type_bits = LINUX_S_IFLNK; perm_bits = 0777; break;
case T_SOCK: type_bits = LINUX_S_IFSOCK; perm_bits = 0755; break;
default: type_bits = LINUX_S_IFREG; perm_bits = (ip->rwmode & 2) ? 0755 : 0555; break;
}
st->st_mode = type_bits | perm_bits;
@ -812,29 +814,61 @@ bad_link:
// is the standard shape -- and against -1/EPERM every such test took the
// complaining branch. zsh saving its history is one of them, and it went on
// reporting a failure after the history had in fact been written.
addr_t sys_unlink(void)
// A socket node, for bind(2).
//
// create() is static because everything that creates a file is in this file;
// AF_UNIX bind is the one exception, and it gets a named door rather than
// create() being exported -- the difference matters, because `create` with an
// arbitrary type is a much bigger thing to hand out than "make me a socket".
//
// Returns a locked inode, like create() does.
struct inode *
create_sock(char *path)
{
return create(path, T_SOCK, 0, 0);
}
// The body of unlink(2), by path. Factored out so that a failed bind can take
// its own node back out without going through the syscall entry, and so there
// is one implementation of what unlink means rather than two.
//
// The caller brackets this with begin_op()/end_op(), the same as sys_unlink.
int
unlink_path(char *path)
{
struct inode *ip, *dp;
char name[DIRSIZ], *path;
char name[DIRSIZ];
uint off;
int err = EPERM;
if (argstr(0, &path) < 0) return -EFAULT;
begin_op();
if (!(dp = nameiparent(path, name))) { end_op(); return -ENOENT; }
if (!(dp = nameiparent(path, name))) return -ENOENT;
ilock(dp);
// "." and ".." are refused by name, which is what POSIX asks for.
if (namecmp(name, ".") == 0 || namecmp(name, "..") == 0) { err = EINVAL; goto bad_unlink; }
if (!(ip = dirlookup(dp, name, &off))) { err = ENOENT; goto bad_unlink; }
if (namecmp(name, ".") == 0 || namecmp(name, "..") == 0) { err = EINVAL; goto bad; }
if (!(ip = dirlookup(dp, name, &off))) { err = ENOENT; goto bad; }
ilock(ip);
if (ip->nlink < 1) panic("unlink: nlink < 1");
if (ip->type == T_DIR && dirempty(ip) != 1) { iunlockput(ip); err = ENOTEMPTY; goto bad_unlink; }
if (dirunlink(dp, name, off) < 0) { iunlockput(ip); err = EIO; goto bad_unlink; }
if (ip->type == T_DIR && dirempty(ip) != 1) { iunlockput(ip); err = ENOTEMPTY; goto bad; }
if (dirunlink(dp, name, off) < 0) { iunlockput(ip); err = EIO; goto bad; }
if (ip->type == T_DIR) { dp->nlink--; iupdate(dp); }
iunlockput(dp); ip->nlink--; iupdate(ip); iunlockput(ip);
end_op(); return 0;
bad_unlink: iunlockput(dp); end_op(); return -err;
return 0;
bad:
iunlockput(dp);
return -err;
}
addr_t sys_unlink(void)
{
char *path;
int r;
if (argstr(0, &path) < 0) return -EFAULT;
begin_op();
r = unlink_path(path);
end_op();
return r;
}
addr_t sys_exec(void)
{
char *path, *argv[MAXARG], *envp[MAXENV];

View file

@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "fs.h"
#include "spinlock.h"
#include "sleeplock.h"
#include "stat.h"
#include "file.h"
#include "posix.h"
#include "syscall.h"
@ -241,7 +242,46 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE(bind)
if ((r = fetch_sun_path(uaddr, ulen, path)) < 0)
return r;
return sockbind(s, path);
// The node lives in the filesystem now, and it is made here rather than in
// sockbind() because this is the layer that has both -- kernel/net/unix.c
// knows about sockets and has no business calling create().
//
// EADDRINUSE comes from the directory, not from a scan of the socket
// table: the name being taken is a property of the filesystem, and a
// socket file left behind by a crashed server has to refuse a rebind for
// the same reason a running one does. Otherwise two servers both believe
// they own it.
{
struct inode *ip;
uint dev;
uint64 ino;
begin_op();
if ((ip = namei(path)) != 0) {
iput(ip);
end_op();
return -EADDRINUSE;
}
if ((ip = create_sock(path)) == 0) {
end_op();
return -ENOENT; // the directory does not exist
}
dev = ip->dev;
ino = ip->inum;
iunlockput(ip);
end_op();
r = sockbind(s, path, dev, ino);
if (r < 0) {
// Take the node back out, so a failed bind leaves nothing behind
// for the next one to trip over.
begin_op();
unlink_path(path);
end_op();
}
return r;
}
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE(listen)
@ -277,7 +317,27 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE(connect)
if ((r = fetch_sun_path(uaddr, ulen, path)) < 0)
return r;
return sockconnect(s, path);
// Resolve the path here, for the same reason bind() creates here. A path
// that names nothing, or names something that is not a socket, is
// ECONNREFUSED -- which is what Linux says and what a client can act on.
{
struct inode *ip;
uint dev;
uint64 ino;
short type;
if ((ip = namei(path)) == 0)
return -ECONNREFUSED;
ilock(ip);
dev = ip->dev;
ino = ip->inum;
type = ip->type;
iunlockput(ip);
if (type != T_SOCK)
return -ECONNREFUSED;
return sockconnect(s, dev, ino);
}
}
// accept(2) and accept4(2) share everything but the flags word.

View file

@ -4,12 +4,20 @@
#include "types.h"
#include "user.h"
extern void _xv6_exit(void);
// The raw syscall. It takes the status in %rdi, and both callers below must
// pass one: this declaration used to be `void _xv6_exit(void)`, so the status
// was whatever the caller happened to leave in that register. Every program
// that ended with a bare exit() reported a random number, which is why
// `if socktest; then` could not work for any of them.
extern void _xv6_exit(int status);
// exit(void) in this library means exit(0). A program that wants to report
// something returns it from main -- lib/start.S passes that through now -- or
// calls exit_group(n).
void
exit(void)
{
_xv6_exit();
_xv6_exit(0);
for (;;);
}
@ -84,7 +92,9 @@ memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, unsigned long n)
void
__stack_chk_fail(void)
{
_xv6_exit();
// A smashed stack is not a successful run. 134 is what a shell reports for
// SIGABRT, which is the nearest true thing this can say.
_xv6_exit(134);
for (;;);
}

View file

@ -39,6 +39,18 @@ _start:
andq $-16, %rsp
callq main /* main(%rdi = argc, %rsi = argv) */
callq exit /* exit() is noreturn, but be certain */
/* main's return value is the exit status, and it used to be thrown away.
*
* sys_exit() reads the status from %rdi, and nothing put it there -- so
* every first-party program exited with whatever happened to be in that
* register, and `if socktest; then` could not work for any of them. The
* test suites all end in `return failures ? 1 : 0` and none of it reached
* the shell.
*
* %eax, not %rax: the status is the low eight bits, and a `return 0` from
* a C function leaves only %eax defined. */
movl %eax, %edi
callq exit_group /* noreturn, but be certain */
1: hlt
jmp 1b