SchOS/include/proc.h
Nexoniarz 14f0e4d0e2 kernel: processes have an environment now, and zsh is the shell
Porting zsh found four defects in the kernel and one in the filesystem. None
of them were about zsh; all of them had been there the whole time.

**exec threw the environment away.** kernel/fs/exec.c wrote a single zero for
envp with the comment "(no environment)" -- not yet, but ever, for every
process. musl has been passing a perfectly good envp to execve (Linux 59, which
SchOS answers) and it was never read. So $TERM was unset, $PATH was whatever
each program invented, and a variable exported in a shell did not survive the
exec meant to carry it. exec() takes an envp, sys_exec reads argument three,
and schinit manifests grew an Environment key. The userland two-argument
exec(path, argv) stays as a wrapper that passes null explicitly -- the raw stub
is execve now, so a short caller cannot leave %rdx holding a stray pointer.

**Which overflowed the kernel stack.** Three pointer arrays, ~1.8 KB, on a
4096-byte stack, under exec -> loaduvm -> readi -> SchFS -> btree. Pid 1 went
down on the first exec. The canary caught it and named the process, which is
what it is for. They live in one kalloc'd page now.

**waitpid returned a bare -1** for both "no children" and "interrupted". musl
reads [-4095,-1] as -errno, so userspace saw EPERM; zsh printed "wait failed:
operation not permitted" and abandoned the rest of /etc/zsh/zshrc. -ECHILD and
-EINTR now. Third time a bare -1 has cost real time -- on a system with no
permission model, EPERM should be read as "a syscall returned -1".

**NVMA was 64.** musl's allocator takes a mapping per size class and does not
release them eagerly, so compinit ran out of slots and got -1, which is EPERM,
which malloc turns into NULL, which zsh reports as "fatal error: out of memory"
-- on a machine with 1000 MB free. 256 slots, and -ENOMEM.

**And a small write to SchFS costs 58 ms.** 200 writes to one open file take
11.75 s; the same to /dev/null take 0.14 s. That is the design stated at the
top of kmount.c -- one transaction group per operation, and a commit is two
flushes and an uberblock -- not a bug. But compdump writes its digest with
thousands of separate prints, so it takes minutes and looks like a hang.
compinit -D, which skips the dump, finishes in 3.6 s. This one is a decision
rather than a fix, so it is written up and left: /etc/zsh/zshrc keeps compinit
switched off and explains exactly why, with the measurements.

zsh runs as /bin/zsh and is the console shell. ZLE works -- arrow keys recall
history through terminfo, $COLUMNS reads the real 160 because TIOCGWINSZ was
fixed, colour and prompt expansion work, startup is 0.14 s. mksh keeps /bin/sh,
so schinit's no-jobs fallback is a different program from the one that could
have failed.

Also fixed while here: AT_CLKTCK was the literal 100 and is USER_HZ; the
extract rule in four ports could move a source tree inside itself when make
re-ran it, which is how zsh's configure came to write modfile=zsh-5.9/... into
config.modules and fail three steps later.

schfs-check passes. Full writeup in docs/history/kernel.md section 14.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
2026-09-12 23:26:50 +02:00

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C

#pragma once
#include "types.h"
#include "traps.h"
// Simultaneous mmap() regions per process.
//
// 64 was enough for every first-party program and for toybox, and not enough
// for zsh: musl's allocator takes a fresh mapping per size class and does not
// release them eagerly, so compinit -- which reads twelve hundred completion
// functions -- ran out of slots and reported "fatal error: out of memory" on
// a machine with a gigabyte free. The slots were the limit, not the memory.
//
// The table is inline in struct proc, so this is NPROC * NVMA * sizeof(struct
// vma) of kernel memory, always resident. At 256 that is about 1 MB total,
// which is worth it to stop a shell dying on a machine that has 1000 MB spare.
#define NVMA 256
struct vma {
uint64 addr;
uint64 length;
int used;
// The pages under this mapping are not ours to free on unmap: either they
// are device memory (the framebuffer) or they belong to something with a
// longer life than this process (a shared memory segment). This was
// `is_fb`, which was the only such case until shared memory existed --
// and freeing another process's shared pages on exit is exactly the kind
// of bug that shows up somewhere else entirely, hours later.
int no_free;
int shmid; // shared segment this came from, or -1
};
// Per-CPU state
struct cpu {
uchar id;
uchar apicid; // Local APIC ID
struct context *scheduler; // swtch() here to enter scheduler
volatile uint64 started; // Has the CPU started?
int ncli; // Depth of pushcli nesting.
int intena; // Were interrupts enabled before pushcli?
void *local; // CPU-local storage (GS base)
};
extern struct cpu cpus[NCPU];
extern int ncpu; // processors present
extern int ncpu_online; // processors actually running
// --- per-CPU variables ------------------------------------------------------
//
// These were `__thread struct cpu *cpu` and `__thread struct proc *proc`, and
// that was wrong in a way that only appears once a second processor runs.
//
// `__thread` means *per thread*, and the compiler is entitled to assume a
// thread's pointer never changes: it reads %fs:0 once and keeps the value in a
// register or spilled on the stack across calls. clang did exactly that in
// sleep():
//
// movq %fs:0x0, %rax # read the thread pointer
// movq %rax, -0x18(%rbp) # spill it
// callq sched # <-- the CPU can change here
// movq -0x18(%rbp), %rax # reload the OLD pointer
// movq (%rax,%rcx), %rax # proc, from the previous CPU's block
// movq $0x0, 0x40(%rax) # NULL, because that CPU set proc = 0
//
// But %fs here is *per CPU*, not per thread, and a kernel thread changes CPU at
// every sched(). So the assumption is false for exactly the variables that
// most need to be right, and the failure is a null dereference deep in the
// scheduler on a machine with more than one core.
//
// The fix is to read the value at each use, with no cached base: an explicit
// %gs-relative access that the compiler cannot hoist across a call. `volatile`
// is what forbids that, and the memory clobber on the setters keeps stores in
// order with the rest of the scheduler's bookkeeping.
//
// Layout of the per-CPU block, whose base is in both FS_BASE and GS_BASE, set
// by seginit() in kernel/arch/x86_64/vm.c:
//
// +0 self-pointer required by the x86-64 TLS ABI (%fs:0)
// +8 syscall scratch trapasm.S parks %rsp here across the stack switch
// +16 struct cpu *
// +24 struct proc *
//
// Offset 8 is NOT free. syscall_entry uses %fs:(8) as its scratch slot, and
// because seginit() sets GS base and FS base to the same address, %fs:8 and
// %gs:8 are the same memory. Putting `cpu` there made every syscall overwrite
// it with %rsp -- a #GP in syscall_entry itself, several layers below anything
// that could report it.
//
// trapasm.S reads %gs:24 for proc on the way out to user mode, so these three
// offsets are shared with assembly and must not be reordered.
#define PERCPU_SELF 0
#define PERCPU_SCRATCH 8
#define PERCPU_CPU 16
#define PERCPU_PROC 24
static inline struct cpu *
cpu_get(void)
{
struct cpu *c;
asm volatile("movq %%gs:16, %0" : "=r" (c));
return c;
}
static inline void
cpu_set(struct cpu *c)
{
asm volatile("movq %0, %%gs:16" :: "r" (c) : "memory");
}
static inline struct proc *
proc_get(void)
{
struct proc *p;
asm volatile("movq %%gs:24, %0" : "=r" (p));
return p;
}
static inline void
proc_set(struct proc *p)
{
asm volatile("movq %0, %%gs:24" :: "r" (p) : "memory");
}
// Named mycpu()/myproc(), as xv6-riscv does, and *not* spelled `cpu`/`proc`.
// A macro by those names would also rewrite every `struct cpu` and
// `struct proc`, because macros have no namespace and tags do -- which is
// exactly why the variables could carry those names in the first place.
#define mycpu() cpu_get()
#define myproc() proc_get()
// Saved registers for kernel context switches (x86_64 ABI)
struct context {
uint64 r15;
uint64 r14;
uint64 r13;
uint64 r12;
uint64 rbx;
uint64 rbp;
uint64 rip;
};
enum procstate { UNUSED, EMBRYO, SLEEPING, RUNNABLE, RUNNING, ZOMBIE };
// Per-process state
// A copy of the interesting fields of one process, taken under ptable.lock.
// procfs reads these rather than struct proc, so nothing outside proc.c needs
// the lock or the layout.
struct procinfo {
int pid, ppid, pgid, sid;
uint uid;
int state; // enum procstate
uint64 sz;
int killed;
char name[16];
char exe[64]; // full path, for /proc/<pid>/exe
};
struct proc {
uint64 sz; // Size of process memory (bytes) [+0x00]
pml4e_t* pgdir; // Page table (PML4 on x86_64) [+0x08]
char *kstack; // Bottom of kernel stack [+0x10]
uint64 fs_base; // User TLS base (IA32_FS_BASE MSR) [+0x18] ← trapasm.S depends on this offset
enum procstate state; // Process state [+0x20]
int pid; // [+0x24]
struct proc *parent; // [+0x28]
struct trapframe *tf; // [+0x30]
struct context *context; // [+0x38]
void *chan; // [+0x40]
int killed; // [+0x48]
int _pad; // [+0x4c]
struct file *ofile[NOFILE]; // Open files [+0x50]
struct inode *cwd; // follows
char name[16]; //
// The path exec() was given. `name` is only the last component and only 15
// characters of it, which is what /proc/<pid>/stat wants; this is the whole
// path, reported by /proc/<pid>/exe.
//
// Note it is exposed as a regular *file*, not the symlink Linux uses, so
// `cat /proc/1/exe` works but readlink() does not. That is why `ps -o comm`
// still prints "[init]": toybox readlink()s exe and brackets the name when
// that fails. Default ps and top output is unaffected. Fixing it properly
// means symlink support in procfs, which is worth doing with the rest of the
// VFS work rather than on its own.
char exe[64];
// A kernel thread's entry point, or 0 for an ordinary process.
//
// Set by kthread_create and dispatched by forkret. A kernel thread has a
// page directory with only the kernel mapped and never returns to user mode,
// so it has no trapframe worth speaking of and no user stack -- it simply
// runs `kfn` forever inside the scheduler's ordinary rotation, which is what
// makes it able to sleep and to be preempted like anything else.
void (*kfn)(void);
uint64 signal_mask;
uint64 pending_signals;
int alarm_ticks;
char ofile_flags[NOFILE];
// Real signal delivery (added for SIGCHLD — see kernel/sys/syscall.c's
// deliver_signals() and kernel/proc/proc.c's exit()). sig_handler[sig]/
// sig_restorer[sig] come straight from the user's struct sigaction
// (sys_rt_sigaction); 0 means no handler installed. saved_sigtf stashes
// the pre-signal trapframe so sys_rt_sigreturn() can restore it; in_signal
// prevents re-entering a handler while one is already running (we don't
// support nested signal delivery).
uint64 sig_handler[32];
uint64 sig_restorer[32];
struct trapframe saved_sigtf;
int in_signal;
// rt_sigsuspend() support: the pre-suspend mask to restore once the
// handler that woke us finishes (sigsuspend swaps the mask atomically
// for the duration of the wait -- POSIX). sigsusp_active is set while a
// restore is owed; sys_rt_sigreturn() performs it.
uint64 sigsusp_oldmask;
int sigsusp_active;
struct vma vma[NVMA]; // VMA tracking for mmap
uint64 mmap_next; // next free mmap VA (bump allocator, see sys_mmap)
// ABI translation (Linux compat syscall number map)
int *syscall_map;
int map_size;
// Current working directory path; maintained by sys_chdir / sys_fchdir.
char cwd_path[256];
// --- POSIX process identity -------------------------------------------
// Appended at the end of the struct deliberately: trapasm.S hard-codes the
// offsets of the fields at the top (see the _Static_assert on fs_base in
// kernel/proc/proc.c), so nothing may be inserted above them.
// Exit status, already encoded the way wait(2) reports it -- see
// W_EXITCODE() below. Read by waitpid() before the slot is recycled.
int xstate;
// Signal that killed us, if any. Set by sigsend() alongside ->killed so the
// eventual exit() can report *which* signal, instead of a blanket SIGKILL.
int killsig;
// Process group and session. Job control is defined entirely in terms of
// these: a shell puts each pipeline in its own process group and signals the
// group, not individual pids. Without them a shell's wait loop cannot work,
// which is why mksh's job control never made progress.
int pgid;
int sid;
// Real/effective/saved user and group ids. Nothing enforces permissions with
// them yet (the on-disk format has no owner field until SchFS), but they
// are tracked honestly so getuid()/setuid() stop lying to userland.
uint uid, euid, suid;
uint gid, egid, sgid;
};
#define FD_CLOEXEC 1
// wait(2) status encoding, as understood by musl's WIFEXITED/WEXITSTATUS/
// WIFSIGNALED/WTERMSIG macros:
// normal exit -> (code & 0xff) << 8
// killed by signal -> sig & 0x7f
#define W_EXITCODE(code, sig) ((((code) & 0xff) << 8) | ((sig) & 0x7f))