Porting zsh found four defects in the kernel and one in the filesystem. None of them were about zsh; all of them had been there the whole time. **exec threw the environment away.** kernel/fs/exec.c wrote a single zero for envp with the comment "(no environment)" -- not yet, but ever, for every process. musl has been passing a perfectly good envp to execve (Linux 59, which SchOS answers) and it was never read. So $TERM was unset, $PATH was whatever each program invented, and a variable exported in a shell did not survive the exec meant to carry it. exec() takes an envp, sys_exec reads argument three, and schinit manifests grew an Environment key. The userland two-argument exec(path, argv) stays as a wrapper that passes null explicitly -- the raw stub is execve now, so a short caller cannot leave %rdx holding a stray pointer. **Which overflowed the kernel stack.** Three pointer arrays, ~1.8 KB, on a 4096-byte stack, under exec -> loaduvm -> readi -> SchFS -> btree. Pid 1 went down on the first exec. The canary caught it and named the process, which is what it is for. They live in one kalloc'd page now. **waitpid returned a bare -1** for both "no children" and "interrupted". musl reads [-4095,-1] as -errno, so userspace saw EPERM; zsh printed "wait failed: operation not permitted" and abandoned the rest of /etc/zsh/zshrc. -ECHILD and -EINTR now. Third time a bare -1 has cost real time -- on a system with no permission model, EPERM should be read as "a syscall returned -1". **NVMA was 64.** musl's allocator takes a mapping per size class and does not release them eagerly, so compinit ran out of slots and got -1, which is EPERM, which malloc turns into NULL, which zsh reports as "fatal error: out of memory" -- on a machine with 1000 MB free. 256 slots, and -ENOMEM. **And a small write to SchFS costs 58 ms.** 200 writes to one open file take 11.75 s; the same to /dev/null take 0.14 s. That is the design stated at the top of kmount.c -- one transaction group per operation, and a commit is two flushes and an uberblock -- not a bug. But compdump writes its digest with thousands of separate prints, so it takes minutes and looks like a hang. compinit -D, which skips the dump, finishes in 3.6 s. This one is a decision rather than a fix, so it is written up and left: /etc/zsh/zshrc keeps compinit switched off and explains exactly why, with the measurements. zsh runs as /bin/zsh and is the console shell. ZLE works -- arrow keys recall history through terminfo, $COLUMNS reads the real 160 because TIOCGWINSZ was fixed, colour and prompt expansion work, startup is 0.14 s. mksh keeps /bin/sh, so schinit's no-jobs fallback is a different program from the one that could have failed. Also fixed while here: AT_CLKTCK was the literal 100 and is USER_HZ; the extract rule in four ports could move a source tree inside itself when make re-ran it, which is how zsh's configure came to write modfile=zsh-5.9/... into config.modules and fail three steps later. schfs-check passes. Full writeup in docs/history/kernel.md section 14. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
261 lines
No EOL
11 KiB
C
261 lines
No EOL
11 KiB
C
#pragma once
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#include "types.h"
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#include "traps.h"
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// Simultaneous mmap() regions per process.
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//
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// 64 was enough for every first-party program and for toybox, and not enough
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// for zsh: musl's allocator takes a fresh mapping per size class and does not
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// release them eagerly, so compinit -- which reads twelve hundred completion
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// functions -- ran out of slots and reported "fatal error: out of memory" on
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// a machine with a gigabyte free. The slots were the limit, not the memory.
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//
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// The table is inline in struct proc, so this is NPROC * NVMA * sizeof(struct
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// vma) of kernel memory, always resident. At 256 that is about 1 MB total,
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// which is worth it to stop a shell dying on a machine that has 1000 MB spare.
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#define NVMA 256
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struct vma {
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uint64 addr;
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uint64 length;
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int used;
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// The pages under this mapping are not ours to free on unmap: either they
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// are device memory (the framebuffer) or they belong to something with a
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// longer life than this process (a shared memory segment). This was
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// `is_fb`, which was the only such case until shared memory existed --
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// and freeing another process's shared pages on exit is exactly the kind
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// of bug that shows up somewhere else entirely, hours later.
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int no_free;
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int shmid; // shared segment this came from, or -1
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};
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// Per-CPU state
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struct cpu {
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uchar id;
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uchar apicid; // Local APIC ID
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struct context *scheduler; // swtch() here to enter scheduler
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volatile uint64 started; // Has the CPU started?
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int ncli; // Depth of pushcli nesting.
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int intena; // Were interrupts enabled before pushcli?
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void *local; // CPU-local storage (GS base)
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};
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extern struct cpu cpus[NCPU];
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extern int ncpu; // processors present
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extern int ncpu_online; // processors actually running
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// --- per-CPU variables ------------------------------------------------------
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//
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// These were `__thread struct cpu *cpu` and `__thread struct proc *proc`, and
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// that was wrong in a way that only appears once a second processor runs.
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//
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// `__thread` means *per thread*, and the compiler is entitled to assume a
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// thread's pointer never changes: it reads %fs:0 once and keeps the value in a
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// register or spilled on the stack across calls. clang did exactly that in
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// sleep():
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//
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// movq %fs:0x0, %rax # read the thread pointer
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// movq %rax, -0x18(%rbp) # spill it
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// callq sched # <-- the CPU can change here
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// movq -0x18(%rbp), %rax # reload the OLD pointer
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// movq (%rax,%rcx), %rax # proc, from the previous CPU's block
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// movq $0x0, 0x40(%rax) # NULL, because that CPU set proc = 0
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//
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// But %fs here is *per CPU*, not per thread, and a kernel thread changes CPU at
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// every sched(). So the assumption is false for exactly the variables that
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// most need to be right, and the failure is a null dereference deep in the
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// scheduler on a machine with more than one core.
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//
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// The fix is to read the value at each use, with no cached base: an explicit
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// %gs-relative access that the compiler cannot hoist across a call. `volatile`
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// is what forbids that, and the memory clobber on the setters keeps stores in
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// order with the rest of the scheduler's bookkeeping.
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//
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// Layout of the per-CPU block, whose base is in both FS_BASE and GS_BASE, set
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// by seginit() in kernel/arch/x86_64/vm.c:
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//
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// +0 self-pointer required by the x86-64 TLS ABI (%fs:0)
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// +8 syscall scratch trapasm.S parks %rsp here across the stack switch
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// +16 struct cpu *
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// +24 struct proc *
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//
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// Offset 8 is NOT free. syscall_entry uses %fs:(8) as its scratch slot, and
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// because seginit() sets GS base and FS base to the same address, %fs:8 and
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// %gs:8 are the same memory. Putting `cpu` there made every syscall overwrite
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// it with %rsp -- a #GP in syscall_entry itself, several layers below anything
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// that could report it.
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//
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// trapasm.S reads %gs:24 for proc on the way out to user mode, so these three
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// offsets are shared with assembly and must not be reordered.
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#define PERCPU_SELF 0
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#define PERCPU_SCRATCH 8
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#define PERCPU_CPU 16
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#define PERCPU_PROC 24
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static inline struct cpu *
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cpu_get(void)
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{
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struct cpu *c;
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asm volatile("movq %%gs:16, %0" : "=r" (c));
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return c;
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}
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static inline void
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cpu_set(struct cpu *c)
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{
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asm volatile("movq %0, %%gs:16" :: "r" (c) : "memory");
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}
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static inline struct proc *
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proc_get(void)
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{
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struct proc *p;
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asm volatile("movq %%gs:24, %0" : "=r" (p));
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return p;
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}
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static inline void
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proc_set(struct proc *p)
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{
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asm volatile("movq %0, %%gs:24" :: "r" (p) : "memory");
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}
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// Named mycpu()/myproc(), as xv6-riscv does, and *not* spelled `cpu`/`proc`.
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// A macro by those names would also rewrite every `struct cpu` and
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// `struct proc`, because macros have no namespace and tags do -- which is
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// exactly why the variables could carry those names in the first place.
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#define mycpu() cpu_get()
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#define myproc() proc_get()
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// Saved registers for kernel context switches (x86_64 ABI)
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struct context {
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uint64 r15;
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uint64 r14;
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uint64 r13;
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uint64 r12;
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uint64 rbx;
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uint64 rbp;
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uint64 rip;
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};
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enum procstate { UNUSED, EMBRYO, SLEEPING, RUNNABLE, RUNNING, ZOMBIE };
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// Per-process state
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// A copy of the interesting fields of one process, taken under ptable.lock.
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// procfs reads these rather than struct proc, so nothing outside proc.c needs
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// the lock or the layout.
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struct procinfo {
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int pid, ppid, pgid, sid;
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uint uid;
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int state; // enum procstate
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uint64 sz;
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int killed;
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char name[16];
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char exe[64]; // full path, for /proc/<pid>/exe
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};
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struct proc {
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uint64 sz; // Size of process memory (bytes) [+0x00]
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pml4e_t* pgdir; // Page table (PML4 on x86_64) [+0x08]
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char *kstack; // Bottom of kernel stack [+0x10]
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uint64 fs_base; // User TLS base (IA32_FS_BASE MSR) [+0x18] ← trapasm.S depends on this offset
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enum procstate state; // Process state [+0x20]
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int pid; // [+0x24]
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struct proc *parent; // [+0x28]
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struct trapframe *tf; // [+0x30]
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struct context *context; // [+0x38]
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void *chan; // [+0x40]
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int killed; // [+0x48]
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int _pad; // [+0x4c]
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struct file *ofile[NOFILE]; // Open files [+0x50]
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struct inode *cwd; // follows
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char name[16]; //
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// The path exec() was given. `name` is only the last component and only 15
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// characters of it, which is what /proc/<pid>/stat wants; this is the whole
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// path, reported by /proc/<pid>/exe.
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//
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// Note it is exposed as a regular *file*, not the symlink Linux uses, so
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// `cat /proc/1/exe` works but readlink() does not. That is why `ps -o comm`
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// still prints "[init]": toybox readlink()s exe and brackets the name when
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// that fails. Default ps and top output is unaffected. Fixing it properly
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// means symlink support in procfs, which is worth doing with the rest of the
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// VFS work rather than on its own.
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char exe[64];
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// A kernel thread's entry point, or 0 for an ordinary process.
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//
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// Set by kthread_create and dispatched by forkret. A kernel thread has a
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// page directory with only the kernel mapped and never returns to user mode,
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// so it has no trapframe worth speaking of and no user stack -- it simply
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// runs `kfn` forever inside the scheduler's ordinary rotation, which is what
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// makes it able to sleep and to be preempted like anything else.
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void (*kfn)(void);
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uint64 signal_mask;
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uint64 pending_signals;
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int alarm_ticks;
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char ofile_flags[NOFILE];
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// Real signal delivery (added for SIGCHLD — see kernel/sys/syscall.c's
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// deliver_signals() and kernel/proc/proc.c's exit()). sig_handler[sig]/
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// sig_restorer[sig] come straight from the user's struct sigaction
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// (sys_rt_sigaction); 0 means no handler installed. saved_sigtf stashes
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// the pre-signal trapframe so sys_rt_sigreturn() can restore it; in_signal
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// prevents re-entering a handler while one is already running (we don't
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// support nested signal delivery).
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uint64 sig_handler[32];
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uint64 sig_restorer[32];
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struct trapframe saved_sigtf;
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int in_signal;
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// rt_sigsuspend() support: the pre-suspend mask to restore once the
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// handler that woke us finishes (sigsuspend swaps the mask atomically
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// for the duration of the wait -- POSIX). sigsusp_active is set while a
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// restore is owed; sys_rt_sigreturn() performs it.
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uint64 sigsusp_oldmask;
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int sigsusp_active;
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struct vma vma[NVMA]; // VMA tracking for mmap
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uint64 mmap_next; // next free mmap VA (bump allocator, see sys_mmap)
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// ABI translation (Linux compat syscall number map)
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int *syscall_map;
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int map_size;
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// Current working directory path; maintained by sys_chdir / sys_fchdir.
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char cwd_path[256];
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// --- POSIX process identity -------------------------------------------
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// Appended at the end of the struct deliberately: trapasm.S hard-codes the
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// offsets of the fields at the top (see the _Static_assert on fs_base in
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// kernel/proc/proc.c), so nothing may be inserted above them.
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// Exit status, already encoded the way wait(2) reports it -- see
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// W_EXITCODE() below. Read by waitpid() before the slot is recycled.
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int xstate;
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// Signal that killed us, if any. Set by sigsend() alongside ->killed so the
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// eventual exit() can report *which* signal, instead of a blanket SIGKILL.
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int killsig;
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// Process group and session. Job control is defined entirely in terms of
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// these: a shell puts each pipeline in its own process group and signals the
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// group, not individual pids. Without them a shell's wait loop cannot work,
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// which is why mksh's job control never made progress.
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int pgid;
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int sid;
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// Real/effective/saved user and group ids. Nothing enforces permissions with
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// them yet (the on-disk format has no owner field until SchFS), but they
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// are tracked honestly so getuid()/setuid() stop lying to userland.
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uint uid, euid, suid;
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uint gid, egid, sgid;
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};
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#define FD_CLOEXEC 1
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// wait(2) status encoding, as understood by musl's WIFEXITED/WEXITSTATUS/
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// WIFSIGNALED/WTERMSIG macros:
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// normal exit -> (code & 0xff) << 8
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// killed by signal -> sig & 0x7f
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#define W_EXITCODE(code, sig) ((((code) & 0xff) << 8) | ((sig) & 0x7f)) |