sendmsg/recvmsg with SCM_RIGHTS. Item 1 of docs/plan/foundations.md and
mechanism 1 of docs/plan/hybrid.md, which are the same primitive seen from two
directions: Wayland's wl_shm_create_pool passes a file descriptor with no
integer-shaped alternative, and handing a driver process the device it is
allowed to touch is the same act. Both plans stopped here.
Linux's structures byte for byte -- msghdr, cmsghdr, the CMSG_ macros -- because
the programs that need this are not ours. libwayland and toybox both call
recvmsg with Linux's headers and would not notice a friendlier door.
The delivery rule is the whole design. A batch of descriptors is pinned to the
stream position of the first byte of the message that carried it, and that has
two halves: a reader arriving at that position is handed them, and a reader that
has not reached it is stopped SHORT of it. Leave out the second half and a
program asking for 4096 bytes swallows three messages and is handed one
message's descriptors, with nothing in the result saying which. socktest checks
exactly that: two one-byte messages, an eight-byte read, one byte back.
The kernel holds a reference to every descriptor in flight, so a sender may
close its own copy the moment sendmsg returns. Giving that reference back is the
part that leaks if it is not written down, and there are three ways a message
ends:
- received with room installed in the receiver's table
- received without room, or by
plain read(2) closed; MSG_CTRUNC for the first case
- never received, socket closed closed by sockclose
The middle row looks like a choice and is not: holding kernel references for a
receiver that has proved it is not looking is a leak with extra steps.
No garbage collector. A socket descriptor sent over that same socket and never
received holds a reference to the socket that holds the reference to it, and
neither close reaches zero. Linux carries several hundred lines for this.
Nothing on either plan passes a socket over a socket -- Wayland passes memory,
the driver work passes devices -- so it is a bounded leak that is documented
rather than a silent one.
Fourteen checks in cmd/socktest, and every one moves data through the descriptor
rather than inspecting it. The descriptor passed is always a pipe end, because a
pipe announces its own lifetime: a read of a pipe whose writers are all gone
returns 0, which turns "was the kernel's reference released" -- otherwise
invisible from userspace -- into a value a test can compare.
Two bugs fell out, neither in the new code:
- sockpair() never set the socket's domain, so every socketpair() socket
claimed domain 0. Invisible while the data paths asked only whether a socket
was AF_INET or AF_NETLINK, since zero answers "neither" correctly.
SCM_RIGHTS asks "is this AF_UNIX", and zero is wrong for that one.
- pipe_poll() reports POLLHUP but not POLLIN at end of file, so a non-blocking
read of a pipe whose writers had all gone returned EAGAIN forever instead of
0 -- a program that polls and reads spins waiting for an end that already
happened. sockreadable() always had the equivalent condition; the pipe path
did not. Found because the test helper for "is this descriptor closed" is a
non-blocking read of a pipe.
projects/schcom/README.md said SCM_RIGHTS was done for a long time while nothing
in the kernel implemented it, and an entire GUI plan was drawn on that line.
It is true now, which is not the same as it having been right, and the README
says so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
9.8 KiB
SchIFT — the kernel
Long mode, 4-level paging, preemptive multitasking, and more than one processor. What follows is the parts of the kernel that are not a filesystem, a driver or a protocol stack: memory, processes, scheduling, traps and signals.
Address space
One page table per process; the kernel is mapped into all of them at
KERNBASE = 0xFFFF800000000000, so a trap does not switch CR3.
kvmalloc() maps physical 0–4 GB as four 1 GB pages, with the top one marked
uncached — that is where PCI BARs and the framebuffer live. This is why 3 GB is
the most memory the kernel can treat as RAM, and it is a deliberate simplicity:
a direct map with a fixed offset makes P2V/V2P arithmetic rather than a
lookup.
kalloc() hands out one 4 KB page at a time from a free list. There is no
slab or pool allocator, and the consequence is visible throughout the tree:
every subsystem that needs many small objects has invented its own fixed-size
table — NPROC processes, NSOCK sockets, NDEVICE devices, NSHM segments.
That is why the limits are compile-time constants rather than a design decision
about each one.
The free list carries a canary, checked at the top of both kalloc() and
kfree(), so a wild write into it panics at the point it is touched rather than
handing back a bad pointer that fails somewhere else entirely.
DMA
kernel/core/dma.c owns an arena carved off the top of physical memory before
kalloc is given the rest. Devices need physically contiguous memory; kalloc
cannot promise it, so the region has to be reserved before there is any
competition for it.
Per-CPU state
The per-CPU block's base is in both FS_BASE and GS_BASE, set by
seginit():
+0 self-pointer required by the x86-64 TLS ABI (%fs:0)
+8 syscall scratch trapasm.S parks %rsp here across the stack switch
+16 struct cpu *
+24 struct proc *
These offsets are shared with assembly and must not be reordered. Offset 8
is not free: syscall_entry uses %fs:(8), and because FS and GS base point at
the same address, that is the same memory as %gs:8.
Reached through mycpu() and myproc(), which compile to a single
movq %gs:16 / %gs:24 with no cached base.
__threadis wrong for per-CPU kernel data, and this is the single most expensive lesson in the tree.__threadmeans per thread, and the compiler is entitled to read the thread pointer once and keep it in a register across calls. But%fshere is per CPU, and a kernel thread changes CPU at everysched(). So the assumption is false for exactly the variables that most need to be right, and the failure is a null dereference deep in the scheduler on any machine with more than one core.include/proc.hcarries the disassembly that proves it.
Processes
struct proc in include/proc.h. A fixed table of
NPROC entries, allocated by linear scan.
The field order at the top of the struct is fixed by assembly. trapasm.S
hard-codes fs_base at offset 0x18, and there is a _Static_assert in
proc.c that fails the build if it moves. Anything new goes at the end.
Each process carries: page directory and size, kernel stack, open file table,
cwd inode and cwd path string, signal handlers and masks, VMA table for
mmap, POSIX identity (pgid, sid, and all six of real/effective/saved uid and
gid), and the Linux-ABI syscall map.
Slot reuse
The table recycles slots, and a recycled slot that inherits the previous
occupant's state is a whole class of bug that has bitten here twice.
allocproc() therefore explicitly clears the signal fields, the exit status,
the kill signal, and the identity fields. The failure mode when it did not:
deliver_signals() jumping to a totally unrelated earlier process's handler
address on this process's very first syscall return.
Kernel threads
kthread_create(fn, name) makes a process that runs fn in kernel mode and
never returns to userland. It gets a page directory with only the kernel mapped,
no files, no cwd, no parent — it is not in the process tree, cannot be waited
for, and must never exit.
The point is that it is a process and not a timer callback: it shares the scheduler's ordinary rotation, so it can hold sleeplocks and block on the disk exactly as a syscall would. The network thread is the current user.
Scheduling
Round-robin over the process table, one scheduler per CPU, each with its own
context. swtch() saves callee-saved registers and switches stacks; sched()
returns to the scheduler and asserts four invariants on the way — holding
ptable.lock, ncli == 1, not RUNNING, interrupts off.
When a full pass finds nothing runnable the CPU halts rather than spinning.
Locking is a single ptable.lock over the whole table. Not per-process: a
scheduling operation touches two processes (the one leaving and the one
arriving) and two-object locking needs an ordering rule that every path obeys.
The same reasoning produced a single lock over the socket table.
sleep / wakeup
xv6's discipline, unchanged because it is correct: sleep(chan, lk) atomically
releases lk and blocks; wakeup(chan) makes every sleeper on that channel
runnable. The atomicity is what matters — a sleeper that tests its condition
under one lock while the waker sets it under another has no interlock and sleeps
through the wakeup meant for it.
Traps and syscalls
Interrupts and exceptions enter through vectors.S → trapasm.S → trap().
Syscalls enter through SYSCALL/SYSRET and syscall_entry, which is a
separate and faster path.
Every entry from user mode checks a canary at the bottom of the kernel stack
page. A deep or nested trap that overflows the 4 KB stack clobbers that word
first, so the failure is reported as kstack overflow at the point it happened
rather than as arbitrary corruption later.
One configuration detail with an expensive history: MSR_STAR's SYSRET
selector field must hold the compat 32-bit code selector, because SYSRETQ
computes the returned cs/ss as STAR[63:48]+16/+8. Putting the real
64-bit user selector there makes every sysretq load an invalid pair — which
QEMU's TCG does not validate, so it stayed hidden until a hardware interrupt
forced a strictly-validated IRETQ.
Signals
Real delivery, not stubs. sys_rt_sigaction() records the handler;
deliver_signals() runs in the tail of syscall(), just before returning to
user mode, and if a pending unblocked signal has a handler it rewrites the
trapframe to enter the handler instead of resuming — stashing the original in
proc->saved_sigtf. sys_rt_sigreturn() puts it back.
The return address is not sa_restorer. SA_RESTORER is not defined in
this musl build, so sigaction() never fills one in, and pushing 0 as a return
address crashes with rip = 0 the moment the handler returns. Instead a 7-byte
trampoline (mov eax,15; syscall) is injected onto the user's own stack below
rsp, clear of the SysV red zone — the standard technique when the C library
supplies no restorer.
Signals without a handler fall back to a default action: termination for the fatal set, dropped otherwise.
PID 1 does not die from a signal it never asked to handle
init_ignores() discards any signal whose disposition is the default action
when the target is PID 1 — including SIGKILL. This is what POSIX requires
and what Linux does in sig_task_ignored(), and without it the system has a
single keystroke that kills it: Ctrl-C signals the foreground process group,
init is pgid 1, and any moment where the terminal's foreground group is still 1
lands SIGINT on init. It has no handler, so exit() runs, and exit() panics
outright on initproc.
Spamming Ctrl-C at a frozen program is exactly the input that finds that window.
Process groups and sessions
setsid, setpgid, getpgid, getsid, and signal delivery to a whole group.
Job control is defined entirely in terms of these — a shell puts each pipeline
in its own process group and signals the group, never individual pids — and
mksh's job control could not make progress until they existed.
What userspace gets
fork, exec, wait/waitpid/wait4 with WNOHANG and real pid selection,
pipes, signals, mmap (anonymous and file-backed), POSIX shared memory, Unix
domain sockets, poll/select/epoll, eventfd, timerfd, signalfd.
mmap uses a bump allocator (proc->mmap_next, starting at 0x40000000) so
every mapping gets its own disjoint, exactly-sized range. It previously assigned
a fixed 8 MB window per VMA slot regardless of the requested length, so a single
allocation over 8 MB mapped straight into a neighbouring live mapping.
What it does not do
- No slab allocator. One page at a time, and every subsystem's fixed-size table is a consequence. This is the single change that would most improve the rest of the kernel.
- No demand paging and no page cache.
mmapof a file reads the whole thing in at map time. WritableMAP_SHAREDof a file is therefore refused outright rather than faked — see ../plan/foundations.md. - No dynamic linking.
exechandlesET_EXEConly: noPT_INTERP, noET_DYN, no shared libraries, nodlopen. - No threads.
cloneexists but does not share an address space;gettidreturns the pid. - Permissions are tracked but not enforced. uid/gid are maintained honestly
so
getuid()/setuid()stop lying, and nothing consults them on access. - No swap, and no memory pressure handling of any kind.
kallocfailing is reported up as-ENOMEMand that is the whole policy. - Nested signal delivery is not supported.
in_signalguards against re-entering a handler while one is running. - Scheduling is round-robin with no priorities, no fairness accounting, and
no CPU affinity despite
sched_setaffinityexisting.