SchOS/boot/README.md
Nexoniarz 651899220c boot: the BIOS loader is gone
1449 lines of boot/bios/, tools/sign.pl and tools/padstage2.pl, plus the
build rules, the disk image and the ISO entry that existed to carry them.

Everything since roughly 2012 boots UEFI, and CSM -- the firmware-side
BIOS emulation that lets a legacy loader run on such a machine at all --
has been going away since Intel dropped support for it in 2020. So this
is not a path being retired early; it is one whose remaining hardware is
already the exception.

The cost was never the code, it was the tax on everything near it. Stage
2 had a 65-sector ceiling it overflowed silently -- 25440 bytes against
24576 -- and because the kernel is written at sector 1 + STAGE2_SECTORS,
an overflowing loader was overwritten by the very kernel it was loading.
The resolution list could not be shared with UEFI either: VBE mode
setting is INT 10h, so matching it needed unreal mode, which is the
riskiest code in the tree for a feature that already worked elsewhere.

What replaces schos.img is the staged ESP, handed to QEMU as a virtual
FAT volume. That is a development arrangement and not an installable
disk; a real GPT image with a real FAT partition is the installer's job,
and until it exists nothing here writes a disk a machine boots unaided.
Secure Boot is untouched too -- the loader is unsigned.

The ISO keeps one El Torito entry, the FAT image holding loader and
kernel. It never booted from a USB stick via BIOS anyway: the firmware
presents the stick as a hard disk while stage2main.c read the kernel back
over ATAPI.

The 32-bit multiboot entry in entry.S now has no caller and is left in
place. Deleting kernel entry code is its own change with its own way of
failing silently, and it should not ride along with this one.

Ported with it: run.ps1, the six screenshot tools, and schcom_test.sh,
each with its own OVMF varstore copy so no run inherits another's UEFI
variables.

Two things this shook out. OVMF now belongs in `all`: nothing boots
without firmware, `make clean` wipes build/ including the copy fetched
from the host, and a clean followed by a build left every run script
throwing. And it cannot be listed as a prerequisite at the top of the
file -- make expands prerequisites when it reads the line, and
$(OVMF_CODE) is defined further down, so naming it there appends nothing
and says nothing.

Verified from a clean tree: 110 [ok] and no failures on the full suite,
the ISO boots with no hard disk attached, schfs-check passes, schcom's
end-to-end pixel test passes, and fbshot captures a real 1280x800 frame.
2026-08-11 10:20:28 +02:00

93 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown

<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 -->
# Booting SchOS
One firmware path:
```
boot/
uefi/ the loader: a 64-bit PE application
common/ the user interface, shared with nothing else now
```
There were two. `boot/bios/` held an MBR, an El Torito CD stub and a real-mode
stage 2, and it was a separate directory rather than `#ifdef`s because the two
shared almost nothing: a BIOS loader lives in 16-bit real mode and talks to the
firmware through software interrupts, while UEFI hands a loader long mode with
paging already on and a table of function pointers to call.
That asymmetry is what removed it. Everything since roughly 2012 boots UEFI,
CSM — the firmware-side BIOS emulation that let legacy loaders run at all — has
been going away since Intel dropped support for it in 2020, and the cost of the
second path was not the code but the tax on everything that touched it: stage 2
had a 65-sector ceiling that it silently overflowed, and the resolution menu
could not be shared because VBE mode setting is `INT 10h` and needs real mode.
The contract below survives it. It was written to let a second loader exist, and
it is worth keeping in that shape: it is what the kernel expects, stated once,
rather than a description of whoever happens to be calling.
## What the loader must hand the kernel
Whichever path runs, the kernel expects the same things. This is the contract;
a second loader is correct exactly when it satisfies it.
| | Where | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Kernel image | loaded per its ELF program headers | entry at `entry64` |
| CPU state | see below -- the two paths differ here | |
| Memory map | `E820_MAP_ADDR`, 24-byte entries, count at `E820_COUNT_ADDR` | `kernel/arch/x86_64/e820.c` reads it |
| Framebuffer | `VBE_INFO_ADDR` | address, pitch, width, height, depth |
| Verbose flag | `BOOT_VERBOSE_FLAG_ADDR` | set by the F8 menu |
The addresses are defined once, in `include/memlayout.h` and `include/schboot.h`.
The kernel does not care which firmware produced them.
## The entry point
UEFI hands a loader long mode with paging already on. Dropping back to
protected mode only to climb out again is a mode switch whose failure mode is a
triple fault with no console, so the kernel publishes an entry that takes the
machine as it already is.
`kernel/arch/x86_64/entry.S` carries a `sch64_header` — magic `SCH64BOO`,
8-byte aligned within the first 16 KB, followed by a 64-bit physical address —
found by scanning. `include/schboot.h` holds the magic so loader and kernel
cannot disagree.
The 32-bit multiboot entry is still in `entry.S` and now has no caller: the
BIOS loader was the only thing that used it. It is left in place rather than
removed in the same change that removed the loader, because deleting kernel
entry code is its own piece of work with its own way of failing silently.
What that entry expects:
- long mode, interrupts off
- CR3 pointing at tables that identity-map the low 4 GB **and** map the same
4 GB at `0xffff800000000000`. `entry64low`'s first instruction is a `movabs`
to a high address, so identity alone triple faults immediately.
- RBX = the framebuffer physical address, and never 1 — that value marks an
application processor in `entry64high`.
The kernel loads its own GDT at that entry (`entry64uefi`), rather than the
loader doing it. A loader arriving in long mode is still on the firmware's
descriptors, and the first thing the kernel does that depends on its own
selectors takes a `#GP` against a GDT the firmware no longer owns — it
surfaced as `unexpected trap 13 ... cs=38`, a long way from the cause.
`e820.c` reads a *BIOS* memory map. UEFI hands out a different structure
(`EFI_MEMORY_DESCRIPTOR`, from `GetMemoryMap`), so the UEFI loader has to
translate it into the same 24-byte entries rather than inventing a second
format for the kernel to learn.
## What booting looks like now
`make esp` stages `EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI` and `schos/kernel`, and QEMU is
pointed at OVMF with that directory as a virtual FAT volume — `make qemu`.
`make iso` builds a disc with a single El Torito entry pointing at a FAT image
holding the same two files.
Neither is an installable disk. A real GPT image with a real FAT partition is
the installer's job, and until it exists there is nothing here that writes to a
disk a machine could boot from unaided.
Secure Boot is not addressed either: the loader is unsigned, so a machine
enforcing it will refuse to run this.