SchOS/docs/plan/hybrid.md
Nexoniarz ea68ef4b54 hybrid: the GPU driver now runs in userspace
docs/plan/hybrid.md's first eviction. cmd/vgpud is the virtio-gpu driver as a
process: it finds the device by vendor and device id, asks the kernel for it,
and does the whole virtio 1.0 bring-up from outside -- reset, feature
negotiation, a virtqueue in DMA memory, GET_DISPLAY_INFO, RESOURCE_CREATE_2D,
ATTACH_BACKING, SET_SCANOUT, TRANSFER and FLUSH.

    vgpud: virtio-gpu at 00:03.0, currently held by virtio-gpu
    virtio-gpu: released to userspace; screen is the VBE framebuffer
    vgpud: claimed
    vgpud: display is 1280x800
    vgpud: scanout is ours, framebuffer at physical 0x3eceb000
    vgpud: drew a test pattern from userspace

Verified by screendumping the virtio-gpu head: the pattern is there, with a
checkerboard that would shear if the stride were wrong. The console carries on
in VBE on the other head at the same time, which is the fallback rule from the
plan working rather than being described.

No syscall knows this is a GPU. The kernel handed over a PCI device and the
process decided what it was -- which is the property that makes this a general
mechanism, and the reason the evictions come before anything foreign.

Four things the first real driver needed that the test program had not:

  - PCI config space (PCIIOC_CFG). A virtio device says where its registers
    are in vendor capabilities, which live in config space, so a driver that
    cannot read it cannot find its own registers.
  - a way for the incumbent to let go: struct pci_driver gained a release
    hook. A driver without one keeps its device, which is always safe and for
    anything on the path to a shell is also correct.
  - the outgoing driver freeing its DMA. Releasing the device but keeping its
    4 MB framebuffer is half a handover -- the incoming driver asks for one and
    is told there is no room.
  - a 16 MB DMA arena. 4 MB was exactly one framebuffer at this resolution,
    and either side of a handover there are two.

And one bug it reproduced on its first working run: vgpud polls the used ring,
so it registered no interrupt handler, and a virtio device interrupts on every
completion. The storm detector said so immediately --

    irq 11: 77780 interrupts/second -- a device on this line is not
    acknowledging it.  handler 'e1000' is attached

-- naming the line, the rate and the neighbour it was drowning. One line fixes
it (VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT before the queue is enabled), and that detector
was worth every minute it cost.

include/virtio.h moved out of the driver directory. Its own comment said it
should when a second reader appeared; one has.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
2026-09-13 18:27:41 +02:00

12 KiB

The kernel becomes hybrid

"Hybrid" is used to mean everything from "a monolith with a nice device model" to "a microkernel that gave up". Drawing the line precisely is most of the work, so that is what this document is.

The device model it builds on is ../architecture/devices.md. It is last on the plan, and the reason is in README.md.


The line

Stays in the kernel, permanently

  • scheduling, address spaces, the trap and syscall path
  • IPC and shared memory — the mechanism everything else is built out of
  • the VFS and the root filesystem
  • IRQ demultiplexing
  • the console and PSOGM

That last one is not a size compromise, it is an invariant. The crash screen must work when everything else in the system is dead, which means it cannot depend on anything that could be dead. A crash screen served by a userspace process is a crash screen that is absent in exactly the case it exists for.

May leave, and should

  • GPU drivers
  • USB, and every USB class driver under it
  • non-root filesystems
  • NICs after the first
  • input transformation — layouts, gestures, remapping

The rule that separates the columns

Anything needed to reach a shell stays in. Anything discovered at runtime, replaceable, or plausibly written by someone else goes out.

That is NT's compromise and macOS's, arrived at from the same pressure, and it is the one that survives contact with a real machine.


Built so far

Mechanisms 2 and 4 exist. /dev/pci (include/pciuser.h, kernel/dev/pciuser.c) enumerates the bus, hands a device to a process exclusively, maps a BAR into it and allocates memory a device can be pointed at. pcitest proves it end to end:

  #  bdf       vendor:device  class        driver
  6  00:04.0   8086:100e     network      e1000
  7  00:07.0   8086:10d3     network      -

device 7: 8086:10d3 (network)
  claimed
  BAR0 at 0x0000000081060000, 128 KB
  regs[0..3] = 0x00140261 0x00000000 0x00080283 0x00000000
  MMIO reaches the device
  DMA 8 KB at virtual 0x40001000, physical 0x3f8eb000

Those register values are the e1000e's CTRL and STATUS, with full-duplex and link-up set -- which is how you tell a working mapping from one that reads 0xFFFFFFFF off an unmapped address. Claiming a device the kernel drives is refused, and everything a process held is released when it exits, because a driver that crashed must not keep its hardware away from its replacement.

Mechanism 3 exists too. A process asks for a device's interrupts and then reads them, uio-style:

  interrupts routed here (line 10)
  interrupt delivered, count = 1
  ICR = 0x80000004

0x80000004 is the e1000e's cause register with the bit the test asserted and INT_ASSERTED set, read back by userspace as its acknowledgement.

The line is masked by the kernel on arrival and unmasked by userspace's write(), and that is the entire design rather than a detail. A PCI interrupt line is level-triggered: it stays asserted until the cause is cleared at the device, which is a different register on every chip and therefore something only the driver can do. Signalling EOI on a line that is still asserted re-enters the handler immediately and for ever -- 72,000 times a second, when this kernel last did it by accident (history/kernel.md §13).

So a driver that dies mid-interrupt leaves the line masked, not unmasked. The instinct is the other way round -- do not leave the device dead -- and it is wrong: unmasking an asserted line with no handler attached is a crashed driver taking the machine down with it. Verified by killing one on purpose:

  interrupt asserted; exiting WITHOUT acking (simulated crash)
  timer: 3431 ticks taken, 3436 expected

Five ticks lost in seven seconds, which is the ordinary background. The next driver to claim the device re-arms the line, so masked is safe without being permanent -- also verified.

The first eviction happened

cmd/vgpud is the virtio-gpu driver, outside the kernel. It finds the device by vendor and device id, asks for it, and the kernel driver hands it over:

vgpud: virtio-gpu at 00:03.0, currently held by virtio-gpu
virtio-gpu: released to userspace; screen is the VBE framebuffer
vgpud: claimed
vgpud: display is 1280x800
vgpud: scanout is ours, framebuffer at physical 0x3eceb000
vgpud: drew a test pattern from userspace

Full virtio 1.0 bring-up from a process: reset, feature negotiation, virtqueue in DMA memory, GET_DISPLAY_INFO, RESOURCE_CREATE_2D, ATTACH_BACKING, SET_SCANOUT, and TRANSFER/FLUSH to present. The pattern it draws is on the virtio-gpu head while the console carries on in VBE on the other one -- which is the fallback rule working rather than being described.

No syscall knows this is a GPU. The kernel handed over a PCI device; the process decided what it was. That is the property that makes the interface general, and it is why the evictions come before anything foreign.

What the first real driver asked for that a test program had not

  • PCI configuration space (PCIIOC_CFG). A virtio device says where its registers are in vendor capabilities, which live in config space -- so a driver that cannot read it cannot find its own registers. Anything modern is discovered the same way.
  • A way for the incumbent to let go. struct pci_driver gained a release hook. A driver without one keeps its device, which is always safe and, for anything on the path to a shell, correct.
  • The outgoing driver freeing its DMA. Releasing the device while keeping its 4 MB framebuffer is half a handover: the incoming driver asks for one and is told there is no room. Found by doing it.
  • A bigger arena. 4 MB was exactly one framebuffer at this resolution, and for the moment either side of a handover there are two. 16 MB now.

And one bug it reproduced immediately

The first working run raised this:

irq 11: 77780 interrupts/second -- a device on this line is not acknowledging it.
irq 11:   handler 'e1000' is attached

vgpud polls the used ring, so it registered no handler -- and a virtio device interrupts on every completion. A level-triggered line nobody acknowledges re-fires for ever, drowning the e1000 that shares it. The fix is one line, VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT before the queue is enabled, and the value of it is that the storm detector built for history/kernel.md section 13 named the line, the rate and the neighbour without anyone having to look.

The control channel (mechanism 1) is what remains.

One thing the interface is deliberately not

It is about PCI devices, not about any driver model, and its first users will be SchOS's own drivers. That ordering is the design: an interface whose first consumers are native drivers is a general mechanism that something foreign can use later, rather than a hole shaped like something foreign. The difference matters technically -- a Linux-shaped interface would be wrong for the evictions this plan actually calls for -- and it happens to be the only version that survives a licensing conversation.


The mechanisms

Four, and only the fourth is large.

1. A control channel

AF_UNIX plus SCM_RIGHTS — item 1 of foundations.md, which the Wayland work builds first. A descriptor is how a driver process is handed the device it is allowed to touch.

Do not build Mach ports. The port model is worth its cost when there is a naming and capability story to hang on it; there is not one yet, and inventing it before the first userspace driver exists is designing against an imaginary user.

2. MMIO to userspace

Map a PCI BAR into a process.

sys_mmap already maps the framebuffer's real physical range at its real address — the path exists. This is that path generalised, behind a check that the caller was granted that device.

3. Interrupts to userspace

The handler stays in the kernel and does one thing: write to an eventfd. The driver process reads.

eventfd exists already, and that is why it is the right primitive. A signal would be delivered to a process that cannot safely be interrupted mid-transaction.

4. DMA to userspace

Physically contiguous memory whose physical address the process is told.

kernel/core/dma.c already owns an arena reserved for exactly this, before kalloc gets anything. It needs a door, a per-device budget, and a way to hand the region back.


The honest limitation

There is no IOMMU, so a userspace driver is isolated against its own bugs and not against malice.

A process that can program a device's DMA engine can write to any physical address, whatever its page tables say.

That is not a reason to stop — isolation against bugs is most of the value, and a crashed driver that restarts instead of panicking the machine is the entire point. But it must be written down, because "userspace driver" reads as "sandboxed" and here it does not mean that yet. VT-d/AMD-Vi is its own project and comes after.


Order, and one thing not to do

Do not build loadable kernel modules first

It is the obvious first step and it is a generation behind. It means designing a stable in-kernel driver ABI, which is the most expensive promise in this entire plan, for a mechanism Apple is actively retiring in favour of the one above.

../architecture/devices.md already separates the two ideas. They are separable, and the second one is the one to build.

First eviction: the GPU driver

Four reasons it is the right one and not just the interesting one:

  • The boundary already exists and is already correct — struct display_ops.
  • It has exactly one consumer, the compositor, so the interface has a real user to be judged by.
  • There is a working fallback underneath. The VBE framebuffer stays in-kernel, so a GPU driver that fails to start degrades to a working screen rather than to no screen.
  • It directly serves the work that will actually be happening.

Second: USB

xhci.c is 1364 lines, self-contained, already spoken to through a bus abstraction, and it is where third-party drivers will show up first. This is what DriverKit was built for and the resemblance is not accidental.

The rule that keeps the boot path honest

The kernel keeps a minimal driver for everything on the path to a shell, and userspace owns the good one.

Break this and you get the circular boot failure where the compositor cannot start because the display driver is a process that needs a compositor.


Milestones

H0 Mechanisms 2, 3 and 4, each with a test that exercises it from a userspace program against a device nothing else is using.
H1 A userspace virtio-gpu driver, publishing display_ops across the channel. Schcom talks to it and does not know the difference.
H2 Kill the driver process on purpose. The screen falls back to VBE, the driver restarts, the compositor reattaches. This is the milestone that proves the whole idea, and it is the one that cannot be skipped.
H3 A modeset API, which is the thing an out-of-kernel GPU driver makes affordable and an in-kernel one never got.
H4 USB, same shape.

What it will still not do

  • No isolation against a hostile driver, per the IOMMU note above.
  • No stable driver ABI, deliberately. Out-of-tree drivers remain a recompile-with-the-tree affair until there is a reason to promise otherwise.
  • The root filesystem stays in the kernel, so SchFS cannot be restarted and a bug in it is still fatal. Moving it out needs an initramfs story that does not exist.
  • The first NIC stays in the kernel, because the network thread and lwIP are in the kernel and moving them is a separate project with no current benefit.
  • No driver sandboxing beyond address-space separation — no seccomp-shaped syscall restriction, no resource limits per driver.