docs/plan/ldls.md. SchOS cannot write a driver for every device that exists
and no project can, so the only route to the hardware support an established
system has is to run Linux's. hybrid.md built the mechanisms for this and said
so; vgpud proved them. This is what they were for.
Five rules, and everything else is an implementation of them:
1. Nothing GPL ever enters an image we build. The driver is the user's,
obtained by them, loaded on their machine.
2. It runs in a process, never in the kernel. Legally a module linked into
our kernel is the strongest derivative-work argument that exists, and
practically this is foreign code that must not be able to take the
machine. FreeBSD has shipped from this position for a decade.
3. Facts, not expression. A symbol's signature and a struct's offsets are
facts a compiled driver depends on; comments, macro bodies and inline
bodies are expression and are never carried over. Provenance recorded per
file. Flagged in the doc as wanting real legal advice before shipping.
4. One kernel version at a time, pinned and named, because Linux says in
writing that it has no stable in-kernel ABI.
5. The unresolved-symbol list is the specification. Load a real module and
let the loader say what is missing rather than guessing the surface.
Four pieces: an ELF relocatable loader (ours, clean, no licence question), the
KPI shim (the actual work), /dev/pci as the back end (built), and one new
kernel interface -- a netdev whose backend is a process, which is the exact
analogue of display_ops and is four vtable entries wide.
First target is 8139too rather than r8169, and the reason is decisive: QEMU
emulates rtl8139 and does not emulate r8169, so the obvious choice cannot be
tested at all. 8139too is also smaller, needs no firmware, and uses the thin
mii helpers instead of dragging in phylib. r8169 is what proves it was general,
afterwards and much more cheaply.
The "what it will not do" section carries the honest list, including the two
that are not yet answered: no EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL story, and no IOMMU -- which
for foreign drivers is a materially worse problem than for our own, and is the
strongest argument for one this project has produced.
hybrid.md is closed and leaves the register; ldls.md takes the slot, which is
the freeze rule working rather than being bent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
Not deferred and not blocked on the per-device ownership interface the last
commit described. Withdrawn, because the premise was wrong.
USB is the bus the peripherals arrive on. Nearly every machine has a port in
some form, down to a bad micro-B on a board with nothing else, and the ones
that have none are not made worse by the stack being there. That makes it
structurally the same kind of thing as PCI, and this plan has never proposed
evicting PCI.
The eviction rule already said so and was read too quickly: "anything
discovered at runtime ... goes out" is about the things USB discovers, not
about USB. The keyboard and the root disk that arrive over it are on the path
to a shell, and the stack that finds them is part of that path.
The obstacles recorded in the previous commit are real, but they are not the
reason. Even with a minimal in-kernel fallback written and a per-device
ownership interface designed, the good USB driver and the minimal one would be
the same driver -- and an eviction that leaves an identical copy behind has
moved nothing.
hybrid.md is now closed and leaves the register in docs/plan/1.0.md. What the
four mechanisms were built for next is the foreign driver host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
The milestone reads "USB, same shape", written before the GPU eviction had
actually been done. Two differences, both found by looking at what depends
on USB rather than at xhci.c.
The GPU could leave because there was a working fallback underneath it --
the VBE framebuffer stays in the kernel, which is one of the four reasons
it was chosen to go first. USB has no fallback and carries two things on
the path to a shell: the root disk, through bio.c's USBDISK_DEV dispatch
and the usbstick.img `make` builds, and the keyboard, through usb_hid into
input_report -- which is how anything without PS/2 is typed on, including
the Chromebox this is meant to boot. Evicting xhci.c wholesale produces
this plan's own circular boot failure with different clothes on: the root
filesystem cannot mount because the storage driver is a process that lives
on the root filesystem.
The subtler difference is probably the harder one. /dev/pci hands over a
PCI function -- one device, one owner, nothing shared. A USB device sits
behind a controller other devices also sit behind, so the unit of ownership
and the unit of hardware stop being the same thing. Handing a process "the
xHCI controller" hands it the keyboard too; handing it "one USB device" is
an interface /dev/pci does not have and this plan has not designed.
No code. H4 needs that interface decided first, and recording it here beats
discovering it halfway through 2,550 lines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
H3 of docs/plan/hybrid.md -- "a modeset API, which is the thing an
out-of-kernel GPU driver makes affordable and an in-kernel one never got".
# schmode modes
1280x800 *
1280x720
1024x768
800x600
640x480
# schmode 1024 768
1024x768 ok
Captured off the virtio-gpu head, the frames really come back 1280x800,
1024x768, 640x480 and 1280x800 again, with the checkerboard band showing no
shear at any of them.
Nothing in the kernel changed for this. No syscall on the path has heard of
a scanout: schmode writes a line to a socket and vgpud sends five commands
to the device. The comparison is the point -- the same five commands in the
kernel would have been the same five commands *and a reason to be nervous*,
because a wrong one there takes the machine instead of one process. That is
why the in-kernel driver never grew one: not difficulty, exposure.
The framebuffer is allocated once, at the largest mode, and every smaller
mode reuses it. PCIIOC_DMA has no free -- a driver's blocks come back when
it exits and not before -- so a modeset that allocated would spend sixteen
slots and then the arena, and the failure would look like a GPU bug rather
than like counting. A larger mode is refused and says why.
vgpud used to end in for(;;) sleep(100) under a comment arguing that
building a control socket before there is a compositor to judge it is the
mistake this plan warns about. That was right about a *compositor protocol*
and wrong as a reason to have no socket: a modeset has a consumer that
exists, somebody changing the mode and looking at the screen, and schmode
is small enough to judge an interface this small. What is deliberately not
on that socket is everything a compositor would need -- no buffer
submission, no damage, no vblank -- which still waits, for the original
reason.
H4, the USB eviction, is now the only milestone left on the plan and is by
some distance the largest thing on the register.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
docs/plan/debugger.md D3 and D4, which finish the plan apart from the
network transport.
D3 -- `whose <addr>`. The views each speak for one subsystem, which is what
keeps them cheap and current, and it is exactly why none of them can see
the bug that matters: a page on the DMA arena's free list looks fine from
dma.c, the same page on kalloc's free list looks fine from kalloc.c, and
that it is on both is a fact no single subsystem holds.
# schdbg whose 0x3e239000
phys 0x000000003e239000 kernel va 0xffff80003e239000
dma arena, handed out
pcidma slot 2, 0 KB into a 4000 KB block given to pid 4 (vgpud)
mapped pid 4 (vgpud) at 0x000000004000d000 rwu vma[5] no_free
consistent: 1 owner, 1 mapping(s)
Claimants register the way views do -- one line in the file that owns the
data -- so the kernel image, the log region, the arena, the page allocator,
the pciuser DMA blocks and every page table each answer for themselves.
`mapped` is the one no allocator can answer: there is no reverse map, so
vm_walk_user() goes forward over every mapped page of every live process.
Two verdicts are shouted and everything else is reported as fact. More than
one owner means the second allocator to hand the page out is handing out
memory the first is still using -- the H2 bug, which would have printed as
three lines. Free-but-still-mapped means a page will be given away from
under the page tables that point at it. Deliberately *not* a finding: no
owner at all, because kalloc keeps a free list and no record of what it has
handed out, so an ordinary allocated page has nobody to speak for it and
saying otherwise would be the query crying wolf.
D4 -- watchpoints, on the four debug registers that had been sitting unused
since this kernel was written. Armed against the same framebuffer page and
then killing the driver:
watch 0: 0xffff80003e239000 written, 8 byte(s), by stosq+0x1f, pid 12 vgpud
#0 memset+0xba
#1 dma_alloc+0x2e2
#2 do_dma+0x22a
#3 pciuser_ioctl+0x13b
#4 sys_ioctl+0x3c7
#5 syscall+0xf6
The chain is the answer, not the rip. It reports and continues -- a data
watchpoint is a trap, delivered after the store completes, so returning
carries on with the program none the wiser, which is what lets this be used
on a machine that is still running.
Debug registers are per-CPU and there is no general IPI here, so the table
carries a generation number and each CPU reloads from its timer interrupt
when it notices the number has moved: one comparison per tick, one tick of
latency at worst. `watch` prints which CPUs have caught up, because "this
watchpoint is watching" and "this watchpoint is watching one CPU" must not
look the same.
Also fixed while testing: watch_init() was called from mpmain(), which runs
on every processor, so the command appeared in the list once per CPU.
dbg_register() now refuses a duplicate name outright, so the next init that
runs per-CPU fails loudly in the list rather than quietly doubling it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
docs/plan/debugger.md, milestones D0, D1 and D2. What they replace is the
ninety-second loop -- add a cprintf, rebuild, boot, read the serial log --
which answers exactly the one question you thought of before the rebuild.
The rule the shape follows: **it observes, it does not control.** No
stepping, no software breakpoints, no stopping the world. Half the bugs
this kernel produces are timing -- an interrupt storm, a level-triggered
line nobody acknowledges, a driver that faults only on its second start --
and every one of them disappears when you halt the machine to look. And
the layering rule, which is the circularity rule the display already has:
a debugger that needs lwIP cannot debug lwIP.
D0 -- symbols. tools/ksyms.pl turns the first link pass into a table the
second pass carries. Two passes is enough because .ksym is placed after
.text and .rodata, so carrying the table cannot move anything recorded in
it; the build lists both passes' text symbols and refuses to link if they
ever disagree, because a symbol table that is subtly wrong gives confident
false answers. ksym.c reads it through weak symbols, so pass one -- which
has no table -- still links. A crash chain now reads panic+0x5f <-
proc_sysrq_cmd+0x99 <- ... <- syscall+0xf6.
D1 -- a log that outlives the kernel. Every character through consputc()
lands in a byte ring with a timestamp per line, readable as /proc/kmsg.
It sits in a region carved before the page allocator gets anything, with a
magic header, so a kernel finds the previous kernel's log still there --
including the whole PSOGM report. panic.c's own comment said "there is no
core dump and no log to go back to"; that is no longer true.
The obvious place for it is the top of RAM beside the DMA arena. That
was the first attempt and the magic came back as ASCII on the reboot,
because the top of usable memory is exactly where the firmware makes its
own allocations. It lives above the kernel image instead, which is a
stable address across boots of the same build.
D2 -- the introspection registry. A subsystem publishes its state with one
line at the bottom of the file that owns the data:
dbg_register("dma", dma_dump, "the DMA arena's free extents");
Seven views -- dma, mem, proc, vma, claims, pci, sock -- reachable three
ways: sysrq 'g' (always, no process and no filesystem), /dev/dbg (echo a
line, cat the answer), and schdbg. The protocol is lines of text because
the same bytes have to work where nothing can allocate or frame a record,
and because a protocol you cannot drive by hand is one you cannot debug.
struct sbuf moved out of kernel/dev/procfs.c into include/sbuf.h rather
than being written a second time.
Several views exist because of a specific bug. `vma` is the table that
decides whether exit() frees a page, and the DMA ownership bug that made
this worth building was a block that was never in it.
Also fixed, found by building with clang for the first time in a while:
struct iovec was defined in both posix.h and socket.h, and every file that
included both was a redefinition. GCC 15 defaults to C23, which permits an
identical struct redeclaration, so the gcc path never noticed -- while
clang defaults to gnu17 and rejected it, breaking the one toolchain
shell.nix exists to provide and the UEFI loader requires. Both are now
guarded.
D3 (`whose <addr>`, the cross-subsystem ownership query) and D4 (hardware
watchpoints on DR0-DR3) are not built and are described honestly as
missing in the architecture doc's "What it does not do".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
H2 of docs/plan/hybrid.md -- the milestone the plan itself calls the one
that proves the whole idea, and the one that cannot be skipped.
# cat /proc/schinit
1 4 11 os.schos.vgpud
# kill 4
schinitd: restarting os.schos.vgpud
vgpud: claimed
vgpud: pid 8 drew a test pattern from userspace
The test pattern ends in a twelve-block tally of the drawing process's
pid, because a second run that redraws an identical picture is
indistinguishable from a first run that never stopped. Read off the
virtio-gpu scanout across four generations it says 4, 8, 10, 12, and the
DMA arena hands back the same physical address every time.
What it took:
* A halt the kernel can apply to a device it does not understand.
Clearing PCI_CMD_BUS_MASTER is the only one there is, and it has to
happen before the DMA goes back to the arena -- a dead driver's device
keeps reading a framebuffer the kernel is about to give to somebody
else. Claim sets the bit, release clears it; pcitest shows it in a bm
column, with a third state so a failed read is never printed as off.
* A refusal. vgpu_release() asks vga_fb_restore() whether there is a
framebuffer to put the console back on, and declines to hand over the
device if there is not. The rule that the kernel keeps a minimal
driver for everything on the path to a shell is worth writing down
only if something enforces it.
* The DMA arena not being owned by two allocators at once. This is the
bug that stopped H2: freevm() frees every mapped page below PHYSTOP
and the arena is the top 16 MB of exactly that range, so a DMA block
mapped into a driver went onto the page allocator's free list when the
driver died, while pciuser_release_all() handed the same pages back to
the arena. The restarted vgpud asked for its framebuffer, got pages
kalloc() had already given out -- including its own page tables -- and
dma_alloc()'s zeroing wiped them, so it died inside the ioctl on the
return from a syscall whose stack had stopped existing. do_dma() now
records a VMA with no_free set, the way shared memory does.
* One exit status. KeepAlive must restart a driver that crashed and must
not restart one that has looked at the machine and found its device
absent: on hardware with no virtio-gpu that was fifteen spawns in
forty-five seconds, each printing a line to the console, for ever.
SCHINIT_EXIT_NORESTART is 78, sysexits.h's EX_CONFIG. It is not a new
manifest key -- the wait status has always travelled from PID 1 to the
supervisor, and note_exit() simply stopped discarding it.
The milestone's third clause, "the compositor reattaches", is not done
and is not claimed: there is no compositor running. That is recorded in
the plan as a Schcom milestone rather than counted here.
Closes the register row "A released PCI device" in docs/plan/1.0.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
The failure this is against is not scope creep. It is abandonment by promotion:
a thing gets built to the point where it works, the next thing becomes more
interesting, and the first is left in a corner -- in the tree, not finished, not
deleted, and not in any list. Enough of those and the tree stops matching its
own documentation.
docs/plan/1.0.md now holds the register, and it is the only place anything
half-built is listed. Four sections, because the kinds are genuinely different:
built and connected to nothing (the text layer, a font from disk, socket
activation, wait_vblank); started and stopped part-way (foundations 2-5, hybrid
H2, Schcom v0, a released PCI device that nothing brings back); named in a "what
it does not do" and still true; and frozen -- scoped, unstarted, not to be
started. The rule is that nothing enters except by being finished or deleted,
and that adding a row requires closing one.
1.0.md already said "two things in flight, never three". It was right and it was
not being followed.
Then the corners themselves, because a register written over a tree full of them
is just a longer list:
- cmd/init is deleted. Nothing had execed /bin/init since initcode.S changed
to /bin/schinit; it was built and installed on every image as an unreachable
fallback, and an unreachable fallback rots rather than saves.
- projects/schwm/ and projects/schde/ are deleted. Both said "to be deleted"
in their own first paragraph, which proves only that a directory marked for
deletion is not deleted by being marked. README-only, no code lost, and the
arguments each made are moved into wayland.md where they are still true.
- projects/schcom/schcom and schcom-demo were tracked binaries. Untracked, and
.gitignore'd.
Three code comments and one document described a boot that has not happened
since 7d44eb7. cons_serial_only starts set, but kmain clears it on its first
lines now, so the splash does not survive the boot and the kernel log is on
screen from the start. That reversal was earned by a Chromebox with no serial
port freezing at boot showing nothing at all, and the comments still argued the
losing side of it.
The site:
- a download page. One ISO, what it has actually been run on -- one machine,
under test -- Ventoy and dd, what the first boot looks like step by step,
and the build if you would rather. The support table names one Chromebox
rather than listing hardware, because one Chromebox is the entire bare-metal
record and a list would be fiction.
- Assets/usb.svg, drawn to the same rule as the other marks: two tones,
geometry only, the accent spent in one place, and that place is the activity
light because it is the part that tells you something is happening.
- Download is in both navs and is the hero's primary action; a closing band
ends the front page on it.
- the uberblock-slots and drivers-outside-the-kernel figures are gone. Three
numbers left, including the fastfetch one, which stays because it is funny.
Two things caught by rendering the pages instead of assuming: .hero p was
beating .filemeta on specificity and the file line was coming out at body size,
and the dd command was one line long enough that the card clipped it at `conv=`
-- a destructive command that can scroll half of itself out of view is a good
way to take somebody's disk. It is two lines now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
The site and several documents still described the system as it was before
virtual terminals, the new schinit, the hybrid work and descriptor passing.
docs/architecture/init.md described the wrong program. It documented a single
schinit that parses manifests and supervises jobs, which has not been true since
PID 1 was split: PID 1 forks a supervisor, spawns jobs on its behalf and reaps;
the job table lives in /proc/schinit; a heartbeat runs both ways; and
proc_reincarnate() re-execs PID 1 in place rather than panicking. Rewritten
around what exists, keeping the reasoning that is still load-bearing -- the five
failures of the sibling-init scheme, the escalation ladder, and the three bugs in
the reincarnation path that each had to happen before they were obvious.
docs/plan/init.md is deleted, which is the tree's own rule for finished work and
had not been applied. Fourteen source comments referenced it by part number, so
they are repointed at the architecture doc by section name rather than left
dangling -- a deleted document nobody notices is worse than a stale one.
docs/architecture/devices.md gained the section it has been missing since
/dev/pci existed: what a driver needs from a kernel, why mmap is checked against
the caller's claims, why DMA is a call and not a mapping, and why the write back
after an interrupt is not optional. Also that a released device does not come
back by itself, which is true and was nowhere.
docs/architecture/networking.md gained a descriptor-passing section, and
docs/architecture/README.md's stack diagram gained the two layers and the third
seam it was missing. "Two seams hold the whole thing together" has not been true
since /dev/pci.
docs/plan/README.md said the hybrid work was deliberately last, on the argument
that an interface with no consumer is wrong in ways nobody can see. The argument
was right; the conclusion was not, and the document now says why it changed --
the alternative to a driver compatibility layer is writing a driver for every
device that exists, and the original objection is answered rather than ignored
because SchOS's own drivers are the consumers.
The site: a Hybrid section with the eviction transcript, cards for virtual
terminals, schinit and drivers outside the kernel, and the numbers remeasured
rather than estimated -- 46,961 lines, 207 syscalls. The boot log in app.js is
from a boot taken today, and the lines are trimmed to what the console can show
without clipping, each still a verbatim prefix of real output.
Two small rendering fixes found by looking at the pages rather than assuming:
.console pre's min-height is now scoped to the hero, so a static transcript sizes
to its content instead of reserving eight lines it does not have; and the docs
reader's contents panel strips inline marks from headings, so a heading written
`proc_reincarnate()` no longer carries its backticks into the sidebar.
Every intra-doc link checked; none broken.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
sendmsg/recvmsg with SCM_RIGHTS. Item 1 of docs/plan/foundations.md and
mechanism 1 of docs/plan/hybrid.md, which are the same primitive seen from two
directions: Wayland's wl_shm_create_pool passes a file descriptor with no
integer-shaped alternative, and handing a driver process the device it is
allowed to touch is the same act. Both plans stopped here.
Linux's structures byte for byte -- msghdr, cmsghdr, the CMSG_ macros -- because
the programs that need this are not ours. libwayland and toybox both call
recvmsg with Linux's headers and would not notice a friendlier door.
The delivery rule is the whole design. A batch of descriptors is pinned to the
stream position of the first byte of the message that carried it, and that has
two halves: a reader arriving at that position is handed them, and a reader that
has not reached it is stopped SHORT of it. Leave out the second half and a
program asking for 4096 bytes swallows three messages and is handed one
message's descriptors, with nothing in the result saying which. socktest checks
exactly that: two one-byte messages, an eight-byte read, one byte back.
The kernel holds a reference to every descriptor in flight, so a sender may
close its own copy the moment sendmsg returns. Giving that reference back is the
part that leaks if it is not written down, and there are three ways a message
ends:
- received with room installed in the receiver's table
- received without room, or by
plain read(2) closed; MSG_CTRUNC for the first case
- never received, socket closed closed by sockclose
The middle row looks like a choice and is not: holding kernel references for a
receiver that has proved it is not looking is a leak with extra steps.
No garbage collector. A socket descriptor sent over that same socket and never
received holds a reference to the socket that holds the reference to it, and
neither close reaches zero. Linux carries several hundred lines for this.
Nothing on either plan passes a socket over a socket -- Wayland passes memory,
the driver work passes devices -- so it is a bounded leak that is documented
rather than a silent one.
Fourteen checks in cmd/socktest, and every one moves data through the descriptor
rather than inspecting it. The descriptor passed is always a pipe end, because a
pipe announces its own lifetime: a read of a pipe whose writers are all gone
returns 0, which turns "was the kernel's reference released" -- otherwise
invisible from userspace -- into a value a test can compare.
Two bugs fell out, neither in the new code:
- sockpair() never set the socket's domain, so every socketpair() socket
claimed domain 0. Invisible while the data paths asked only whether a socket
was AF_INET or AF_NETLINK, since zero answers "neither" correctly.
SCM_RIGHTS asks "is this AF_UNIX", and zero is wrong for that one.
- pipe_poll() reports POLLHUP but not POLLIN at end of file, so a non-blocking
read of a pipe whose writers had all gone returned EAGAIN forever instead of
0 -- a program that polls and reads spins waiting for an end that already
happened. sockreadable() always had the equivalent condition; the pipe path
did not. Found because the test helper for "is this descriptor closed" is a
non-blocking read of a pipe.
projects/schcom/README.md said SCM_RIGHTS was done for a long time while nothing
in the kernel implemented it, and an entire GUI plan was drawn on that line.
It is true now, which is not the same as it having been right, and the README
says so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
docs/plan/hybrid.md's first eviction. cmd/vgpud is the virtio-gpu driver as a
process: it finds the device by vendor and device id, asks the kernel for it,
and does the whole virtio 1.0 bring-up from outside -- reset, feature
negotiation, a virtqueue in DMA memory, GET_DISPLAY_INFO, RESOURCE_CREATE_2D,
ATTACH_BACKING, SET_SCANOUT, TRANSFER and FLUSH.
vgpud: virtio-gpu at 00:03.0, currently held by virtio-gpu
virtio-gpu: released to userspace; screen is the VBE framebuffer
vgpud: claimed
vgpud: display is 1280x800
vgpud: scanout is ours, framebuffer at physical 0x3eceb000
vgpud: drew a test pattern from userspace
Verified by screendumping the virtio-gpu head: the pattern is there, with a
checkerboard that would shear if the stride were wrong. The console carries on
in VBE on the other head at the same time, which is the fallback rule from the
plan working rather than being described.
No syscall knows this is a GPU. The kernel handed over a PCI device and the
process decided what it was -- which is the property that makes this a general
mechanism, and the reason the evictions come before anything foreign.
Four things the first real driver needed that the test program had not:
- PCI config space (PCIIOC_CFG). A virtio device says where its registers
are in vendor capabilities, which live in config space, so a driver that
cannot read it cannot find its own registers.
- a way for the incumbent to let go: struct pci_driver gained a release
hook. A driver without one keeps its device, which is always safe and for
anything on the path to a shell is also correct.
- the outgoing driver freeing its DMA. Releasing the device but keeping its
4 MB framebuffer is half a handover -- the incoming driver asks for one and
is told there is no room.
- a 16 MB DMA arena. 4 MB was exactly one framebuffer at this resolution,
and either side of a handover there are two.
And one bug it reproduced on its first working run: vgpud polls the used ring,
so it registered no interrupt handler, and a virtio device interrupts on every
completion. The storm detector said so immediately --
irq 11: 77780 interrupts/second -- a device on this line is not
acknowledging it. handler 'e1000' is attached
-- naming the line, the rate and the neighbour it was drowning. One line fixes
it (VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT before the queue is enabled), and that detector
was worth every minute it cost.
include/virtio.h moved out of the driver directory. Its own comment said it
should when a second reader appeared; one has.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
docs/plan/hybrid.md mechanism 3. A process asks for a device's interrupts with
PCIIOC_IRQ and then reads them, which is how Linux's uio does it and for the
same reason: a descriptor composes with poll, and a driver that stops reading
falls behind rather than losing events. read() returns a count rather than a
flag, so a driver that was busy sees it missed three and acts once.
Proven against an e1000e by asserting a cause through its ICS register and
reading the interrupt back out in userspace:
interrupts routed here (line 10)
interrupt delivered, count = 1
ICR = 0x80000004
0x80000004 is the cause the test set plus INT_ASSERTED -- the device's own
register, read by userspace as its acknowledgement.
**The masking is the design, not a detail.** A PCI line is level-triggered and
stays asserted until the cause is cleared at the device, which is a different
register on every chip and so is something only the driver can do. The kernel
masks the line on arrival and userspace's write() unmasks it. Signalling EOI on
a still-asserted line re-enters the handler immediately and for ever; this
kernel did exactly that by accident at 72,000 interrupts a second, and what it
looked like from outside was a clock running seven times slow (§13).
Which decides what happens when a driver dies mid-interrupt: the line is left
**masked**. The instinct is to unmask -- do not leave the device dead -- and it
is wrong, because unmasking an asserted line with no handler is a crashed
driver taking the machine down with it. Masked is safe and not permanent: the
next PCIIOC_IRQ arms it. Both halves verified by crashing a driver on purpose
and then starting another one.
A line already carrying kernel handlers is refused outright. Masking is
per-line, so handing out a shared one would silence whichever kernel driver is
also there, with nothing logged. MSI is the real answer and pci_msi_enable() is
already in the tree waiting for a caller.
Also fixed, found by running the crash twice: DMA buffers were never returned
when a process exited. The arena is 4 MB and contiguous, so a driver that
restarts a few times exhausted it -- "out of DMA memory, 3584 free" -- which is
a poor property for an interface whose whole promise is that a driver can crash
and come back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
docs/plan/hybrid.md mechanisms 2 and 4: MMIO and DMA to a process.
A process can enumerate the bus, claim a device exclusively, map its BARs and
get memory the device can be pointed at. Proven end to end against an e1000e
-- the exact device class we cannot drive and would want a foreign driver for:
device 7: 8086:10d3 (network)
claimed
BAR0 at 0x81060000, 128 KB
regs[0..3] = 0x00140261 0x00000000 0x00080283 0x00000000
MMIO reaches the device
DMA 8 KB at virtual 0x40001000, physical 0x3f8eb000
Those are the e1000e's CTRL and STATUS with full-duplex and link-up set, which
is how you tell a real mapping from one reading 0xFFFFFFFF off an unmapped
address. Claiming a device the kernel drives is refused -- two writers of one
register set looks like hardware that has started lying -- and everything a
process held is released when it exits, because a driver that crashed must not
keep its hardware away from its replacement.
mmap's offset is the BAR's physical address, checked against the BARs of
devices *this process has claimed*. Without that check the device is /dev/mem
with extra steps and a process could map the kernel's own memory. Mappings are
write-through: a cached write to a doorbell arrives whenever the cache feels
like it, which from a driver's side is indistinguishable from hardware that
ignores you.
The interface is about PCI devices, not about any driver model, and its first
users will be SchOS's own drivers when virtio-gpu is evicted. That ordering is
the design rather than an accident: an interface whose first consumers are
native drivers is a general mechanism something foreign can use later, instead
of a hole shaped like something foreign.
Also: PROT_* and MAP_* moved to include/posix.h. They were defined only in
sys_mem.c, so cmd/fbinfo carried a private copy and this wanted a third --
two copies of a number the kernel compares against, where a mismatch shows up
as a mapping with the wrong permissions rather than an error.
No IOMMU, so this isolates a driver against its own bugs and not against its
own DMA. The plan says so at length and it is still true.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
docs/plan/init.md milestones I2 and I3. The rule change.
**I2 -- the heartbeat.** The failure the two-init scheme could not see is that
an init usually does not die, it *hangs*: wait() never returns for a process
that is merely stuck, so a supervisor watching a wedged init reports
everything normal for ever. PID 1 now pings every two seconds and expects an
answer within ten; silence means stuck, and stuck is worth acting on.
Exercised rather than reasoned about, as the plan asks: `sysrq w` wedges
schinitd by making the scheduler pass over it for ever. It stays alive, keeps
its descriptors and appears in every listing -- which is the point.
Two things that only showed up by running it:
- kill() sets a flag the target checks when it next runs, and the premise
here is that it is not running. Waiting for a corpse that may never be
produced turns the recovery path into a second hang. PID 1 replaces the
supervisor *without waiting*; the old one's socket is closed, so the moment
it runs again its first write fails and it exits.
- the replaced supervisor must notice the hangup. poll() reports POLLHUP and
never POLLIN again, so a loop that only looks for POLLIN sits there
complaining that PID 1 has stopped pinging it.
**I3 -- proc_reincarnate().** exit() on initproc panicked. Now the kernel
tears down nothing, keeps pid 1, and re-execs /bin/schinit in place with a
generation counter. The pid stays 1, so every orphan the kernel reparented is
still correctly parented; the children survive; the open files survive, which
is why this is the first line of exit() and not the last; and the job table
survives in /proc/schinit, which is what it is there for.
The escalation ladder: generations 2-3 carry on, generation 4 ignores
/etc/schinit and starts a console shell only -- a manifest that kills init
must not kill it for ever -- and generation 5 stops, with PSOGM rendering
INIT_RESURRECTION_FAILED, a call chain and a QR code.
Three bugs found by running it, each a lesson about exec():
- exec() returns 0 on success; it does not fail to return. The new image
starts when the kernel returns to userspace through the rewritten
trapframe. Returning from exit() is the success path.
- exit() was reached because `killed` was set, and the trap path checks it
again on the way out. Leaving it set exits the new image before its first
instruction: five generations in a few microseconds, a resurrection loop
that looks exactly like the crash it was meant to survive.
- exec() keeps open files, which is what gives the new image a console --
and also keeps the previous life's socket, holding the old supervisor's
channel up so it never sees a hangup.
Verified: `sysrq i`, and the shell being typed into keeps its pid across the
death and rebirth of PID 1, with /proc/schinit byte-identical either side.
schfs-check passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
docs/plan/init.md milestones I0 and I1.
**The split.** schinit is PID 1 and does four things: bootstrap the
filesystems, fork schinitd, fork jobs on schinitd's behalf, reap children. No
manifest parsing, no filesystem walking after boot, no allocation. It is the
one program on the machine with no supervisor, so it is written to be too
boring to fail.
schinitd is PID 2 and holds everything else -- /etc/schinit, respawn policy,
throttling -- and is restartable, which is where the bugs are allowed to be.
**Jobs are forked by PID 1, not by schinitd.** That is the load-bearing
detail. schinitd decides and asks; PID 1 acts. So every job is a child of PID
1 at all times, and a supervisor that dies orphans nothing, reparents nothing
and restarts nothing.
**/proc/schinit** is the job table, written by PID 1 whenever it changes. The
kernel holds the text and does not interpret it: a procfs generator runs in
the kernel, and walking PID 1's memory to answer a read would put a userspace
program's format into the kernel, where it would rot.
Verified the way the plan asks for -- `kill 3`, then look:
schinitd: adopting os.schos.console-shell
schinitd: adopting os.schos.tty2-shell
/proc/schinit byte-identical across the restart, same pids, same cookies, same
start times, and the shell being typed into never noticed.
The first attempt got I1 wrong in the instructive way: PID 1 published the
table and schinitd never read it back, so the restarted supervisor started
everything a second time -- two console shells on one terminal, which is the
split-brain this plan rejects the two-init scheme for, reached by a different
road. Publishing state is half of it; coming back and believing it is the
other half.
The protocol is include/schinit.h: fixed-size messages, versioned in the
hello, entirely internal. Fixed-size so PID 1 never allocates, and a
supervisor that has gone mad cannot make it run a parser.
Still to come: I2 (heartbeat both ways, so a hang is as detectable as a death)
and I3 (proc_reincarnate, the actual law change).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
A leaf's value area holds variable-length records end to end, so a record begins
wherever the one before it finished -- a multiple of 8 only by luck. The code
reads them by casting a pointer into the block, which tells the compiler they
are aligned when they are not.
That works on x86, which is why it has never shown as a bug, and it is undefined
in C. A compiler entitled to assume 8-byte alignment may emit an instruction
that requires it, and the failure would arrive at a different optimisation level
or on a different architecture looking like filesystem corruption rather than
like codegen. UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer reported 31 of them across obj.c,
objw.c, attr.c and space.c.
Seven types now carry SCHFS_PACKED: dirent_rec, extent, extref, index_rec,
attr_rec, snap and inode. Two of those -- attr_rec and inode -- were never
reported, because schfs_objtest does not reach an unaligned instance of either.
They were latent rather than absent, and casting into a leaf is the same lie
whether or not a test has caught it yet.
NO ON-DISK LAYOUT CHANGED, and that was measured before the annotation was
applied rather than assumed: every one of these already carries explicit `pad`
fields and therefore has no implicit padding, so sizes and member offsets are
identical with and without it. Seven _Static_asserts now pin the sizes, because
a record that silently grows misreads every existing volume from that point on
and looks like corruption rather than like a struct that changed.
schfs_node_hdr, schfs_item, schfs_kptr and schfs_uberblock are deliberately left
alone. The node header is exactly 32 bytes, so the items and key pointers after
it are already 8-aligned, and annotating them would cost byte-wise access on the
tree's hottest paths to fix a problem they do not have.
Verified by reading an image written before the change: schfs_fsck --check
passes on structure, checksums, key ordering, data blocks and derived free
space, and the kernel mounts its own root unchanged.
Also here: mkschfs passed a null pointer to qsort for an empty directory. Every
implementation ignores it when the count is zero; the standard does not say they
have to.
make schfs-check now runs with no sanitizer output at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
Started as "fix the ASAN leak in schfs_objtest" and the test turned out to be
the messenger. The allocation map was taken through a palloc callback and there
was no way to return it: no schfs_space_release, and a comment in
schfs_space_init reading "caller frees what was taken" for an API the caller
did not have.
Three separate leaks from that one gap:
* The kernel leaked the entire map on every unmount -- up to 2 MB, at 8 KiB
per GiB of volume -- because kmount_unmount flushed, cleared `mounted` and
walked away. This is the one that matters; the others are test-only.
* schfs_space_init stranded a page on its own error path. npages was raised
only after *both* of a pair of allocations succeeded, so a failure on the
second left the first outside the count -- unreachable to any cleanup that
could later exist.
* schfs_objtest leaked 2121728 bytes in 518 allocations, which is what made
the whole SchFS suite exit non-zero regardless of its assertions.
The map now carries its own pfree rather than taking one at release time, so it
can only ever be freed by the allocator that filled it -- the kernel's pages
come from kalloc and a host tool's from calloc, and the two are not
interchangeable. schfs_vol_open and schfs_vol_format release any map the volume
is already holding before building another, which is what stops a re-open
leaking; struct schfs_vol must therefore be zeroed before first use, and the
header now says so.
The test's own leak was the last one found and the simplest: it does
memset(&VOL, 0, sizeof(VOL)) before reopening, which wiped the map's pointers
before vol_open could release them. Eight of those, each now releasing first.
schfs_objtest asserts the balance -- 520 pages taken, 520 given back -- because
a suite that leaks cannot detect a leak: the filesystem's own allocations would
arrive as noise inside the harness's. The next one fails the run instead.
make schfs-check now exits 0. The 31 UBSAN misalignment reports are still
there and are still a Gate 0 item.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
Two failures found by running `make schfs-check` rather than by reading it, both
predating the current work -- confirmed by stashing the session's changes and
re-running to byte-identical output.
* AddressSanitizer: 2121728 bytes leaked in 518 allocations, every one from
md_palloc in tools/schfs_objtest.c, the test's own page allocator. The
target exits non-zero, so the whole suite fails whatever the assertions say.
The cost is not the memory -- it is that a real leak in the filesystem would
now arrive as noise inside 2 MB of expected noise.
* UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: 31 misaligned accesses across obj.c, objw.c,
attr.c and space.c, one root cause. Records are read by casting a pointer
into a tree leaf, and a record's offset within a leaf is not a multiple of
8. This works on x86, which is why it has never shown as a bug, and it is
undefined in C: a compiler entitled to assume 8-byte alignment may emit an
instruction that requires it, and the failure would then look like
filesystem corruption rather than codegen.
Recorded as Gate 0 items rather than as nice-to-haves for one reason: a suite
that is red for known reasons stops being read, and then it is red for unknown
reasons too. guides/testing.md now says so up front, so nobody reads the [ok]
lines and ignores the exit code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
The network thread waited on the timer and nothing else, so a frame that landed
just after a poll sat in the ring for up to 10 ms -- the largest fixed latency in
the system. That was deliberate when the stack was new (a receive path woken by
an interrupt is much harder to debug than one that is asked) and there is now a
working stack to compare against, which is exactly when it becomes safe to do.
The frame is still *pulled* by the thread through .receive. It has to be: a call
into lwIP can reach the driver, the driver can sleep on the buffer cache, and an
interrupt handler may do neither. netdev_rx_signal() delivers nothing and reads
no ring -- it only ends the wait early.
The wait stays on the timer tick rather than moving to a channel of its own, and
that is the design. lwIP's timers must still run when the link is silent, so the
clock has to remain a floor under the wait, and sleep() cannot wait on two things
at once. Joining the tick's existing wakeup costs nothing and leaves one wait
with one predicate.
rx_signal lives under tickslock for the same reason it gets no lock of its own:
sleep() releases tickslock atomically, so a driver setting the flag and waking
under that lock cannot lose the wakeup by arriving between the predicate test and
the sleep. A private lock would not be held across the sleep, and that window
would be back. Calling it from interrupt context is safe on the same terms the
timer handler already relies on -- acquire() disables interrupts, so a CPU
holding tickslock cannot be interrupted into it.
The e1000 signals on RXT0 (a frame or burst has landed) and RXDMT0 (the ring has
fallen below its threshold, which is when waiting for the clock hurts most).
Measured rather than asserted: /proc/netif reports wake_rx and wake_tick, and
across three pings rx_frames and wake_rx both went 2 -> 6 -- every received frame
woke the thread through the interrupt. wake_tick keeps advancing as the idle
floor, which is what lwIP's timers need. socktest still passes and ping is still
0% loss.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
docs/ was ten files where a plan, a description, a guide and a bug report all
sat next to each other. It is now architecture/ (what SchOS is), plan/ (what it
will be), guides/ (how to work on it) and history/ (why it is like this), with
an index that states the one rule holding it together: when something is
finished it moves from plan/ to architecture/ and is rewritten as a description
of the thing rather than a record of building it.
A ticked checkbox says the work happened. It does not say what the work
*produced*, and six months later the checkbox is all that is left. The network
stack proved the point: finished, verified end to end, and for a month the only
description of it anywhere was a checkbox four levels of indentation deep.
So roadmap.md went from 534 lines to 181 -- nothing deleted, the done work
graduated. Seven subsystems that were finished and undescribed now have
descriptions: boot, kernel, syscalls, filesystem, networking, graphics, usb,
init. Every one ends with "What it does not do", which is the section that pays;
a document listing only strengths is marketing, and the reader who needs it most
is the one about to trip over a limitation nobody wrote down.
schfs.md still opened with "phases 1 through 3 1/2 are done, phase 4 is next"
long after all five had landed. It is a description now, with the phase record
and the hard-won bugs moved to history/.
Three corrections found on the way, all load-bearing:
* projects/schcom/README.md claimed SCM_RIGHTS was done. There is no
sendmsg/recvmsg in the kernel at all, and an entire GUI plan rested on it.
* The root README said "No TCP/IP" months after the stack landed.
* history/kernel.md sec.7 was marked "in progress" on a problem that process
groups solved.
Also adds plan/1.0.md, which draws a finish line so the open list stops being
infinite, and marks schwm/ and schde/ superseded: in Wayland the compositor is
the window manager, so that split dissolves rather than being abandoned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VQ7Qx8E1q1M1bbCq8QLHS2
Nexoniarz